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67 I.  INTRODUCTION 
Objectives  and  Method  of Research 
A financial  system  can  be  considered  from  a  number  of 
different  points  of view  owing  to the  fact  that it performs  var-
ious different  functions. 
The  present  report is primarily concerned  with  the  accu-
mulation  of capital.  There  ore  two  good  reasons  for this choice. 
The  first arises  from  the  fact  that,  particularly during  the  mid 
1960s,  the  three countries to which  reference is to  be  made  had 
had  a  relatively short  history of capitalist development  (compared 
to that of the  U.S.  ant  the U.K.).  They  were  therefore characterised 
by  a  much  higher capacity and  need  for accumulation.  The  second  de-
rives  from  the  existence of the  crisis that  has  hit,  albeit with 
differing intensities and  modalities,  all the  industrialised  coun-
tries during  the  1970s.  The  needs  of  productive  restructuring within 
these countries,  require an  especial  response  in  the  field  of invest 
ment.  The  attention of academics  and  other specialists has  consequen! 
ly been  turned  to the questionof the  role that  financial  system  can 
perform  in  sustaining this dynamic  process  of  resource  reallocation, 
the  central  mechanism  of which  is the  investment decisions  made  by 
firms. 
In  recent  years,  therefore,  there  has  been  a  return  to  some 
of the  issues  which  had  received  particular attention,  in  Europe, 
around  the  mid-1960s  when  a  number  of important  studies analysed  the 
relation of  financial  systems  to  problems  of economic  growth 
(Lamfalussy  (a),  OECD  (a),  EEC). 
The  present  report takes the  situation  pertaining at thnt  pe 
riod  and  the results of these  studies'  contributions as it's point 
of departure.  There  is a  two-fold  objective in  doing  so.  In  the  first 
place, it is intended  to see  whether or not  the  evolution of the  three -2-
financial  systems  has  proceeded  1n  the  directions that  were  consider 
ed  desirable during  the  secondo  half of the  1960s.  And  if the  paths 
taken  in  the  three  countries  have  had  divergent  results,  then it is 
also  intended  to  ask  whether this differentiation affects to any 
appreciable  measure  the  way  in  which  each  system  places itself in 
relation  to  the  financing  of investment. 
In  the  second  place,  it is intended  to  provide  a  critical 
contribution  to evaluating the  points  of strength and  weakness  in 
the  three  financial  systems'  ability to  fulfill the  functions  ne-
cessary  for  sustaining the  accumulation  process • 
•  The  achievement  of these  two  objectives  obv.Dusly  presupposes 
a  particular "interpretation" of the  functioning  and  evolution  of the 
three  systems.In  reality it is this that determnes  the  report's  con-
clusions  and  therefore constitutes its principal  part.  A more  rigorous 
approach  would  have  required  the delineation  of a  theoretical  schema 
which  would  have  provided  the  means  for  describing  and  interpreting 
the  facts.  However,  it has  been  preferred  to  follow  a  more  pragmatic 
approach  starting with  certain general  premises  and  then,  in  the 
light of these,  modelling  the analysis  around  the characteristics, 
presented  by  each  of the  three  systems  in  the  mid  1960s.  A reconstruc 
tion of the evolution of the  three  financial  systems  is derived  from 
this approach,  centring  on  different aspects of each  system:  the 
effects of anti-inflationary policy in  Germany,  the  manner  in  which 
the credit  system  has  sustained  exceptional industrial development 
1n  France,  the effects of the  peculiar position  of the Italian  banks 
1n  financial  intermediation. 
These  three aspects of these  three financial  systems  are  con~ 
idered essential to an  understanding of the  internal logic  underlying 
the  ways  in  which  they  function.  The  resulting analysis applies at a 
more  general  level  than  that which  could  have  been  derived  from  an 
examination  of the  specific  problem  of investment  financing.It  has -3-
been  decided  not  to attempt  to  compare  the  pattern of  firms'  in-
debtedness  in  the  individual countries considered.  The  reason  for 
this is that  companies'financial  accounts  reflect their relations 
with  financial  intermediaries and  are therefore  the  result of the 
broader logic  which  regulates  the functioning  of each  individual 
system.  At  the  same  time  there are  theoretical difficulties in defin 
ing  an  'optimal'  mix  of  financial  resources available to  firms  on  the 
basis of which  to evaluate experience  in these different countries. 
The  statistics show,  furthermore,  that there exist significant struct-
ural differences  between  patterns of  firms'  indebtedness  in  the various 
O.E.C.D.  countries. 
Other aspects of the  question  have  here  been  ignored.  It will 
be  noted  for  example  that there is no  mention  of interest rates.  Per-
haps it is opportune  to  make  explicit at this  point that it has  been 
a  hypothesis  of this report that it is not  realistic to  retain  as  a 
basic  assumption  any  reference  to the  level of the  medium-to-long 
term  rate of interest  (nominal?,  real?)  as  a  significant means  for 
comparing  the  relationship between  different  financial  structures and 
capital accumulation.  Needless  to  say,  this means  neither that varia! 
ions  in  interest rates do  not  influence  accumulation  nor  that  study 
of the  ways  in  which  interest rates are  formed  through  the  working  of 
financial  intermediaries  and  the  markets  could  not  also  be  important. 
But  both  these aspects  may  be  considered  as  products  of the  function-
ing of a  financial  system;  a  system  which  already,  of itself,  influences 
the  accumulation  process. 
The  justification  for  these,  and  other,  gaps  in this work  lies 
in  the  approach  chosen  in this particular comparative analysis  (1), 
the  aim  being to  pzopose  a  central core  of ideas and  hypotheses  which, 
(1)  Other  comparative  studies of  possible  interest to the  reader 
include:  E.  V.  Morgan-R.  Harrington,  Bank  for  International 
Settlements,  J.  Carrington-G.  Edwards,  B.  Bayliss-A.  Butt  Philip, 
Economists  Advisory Group (see References). -4-
1n  so  for  as  they ore  at all valid,  will  provide  a  basis at a  later 
stage  for  on  analysis of those  aspects of  financial  systems  negl-
ected  in  the  present  work. 
Anglo-American  and  European  Financial Structures 
A financial  system consists of a  combination  of intermedior 
ies and  markets.  In  the  context of the  accumulation  of capitol,  the 
system operates as  the  creator of  new  purchasing  power  (credit  for 
the  production  of  new  commodities)  and  as  the  means  whereby  those 
responsible  for  managing  the  savings generated  by  investments  and 
those  responsible  for  managing  investment itself ore  brought  into 
contact.  The  first  function  is  performed  by  the  bonking  system,  the 
second  con  be  performed  not  only  by  the  bonks  but  also  by  non-bonk 
financial  intermediaries and  by  the  capitol  market.  The  parameters 
of the  first  function vary in  accordance  with  the  rote of growth  of 
the  economy;  whilst  those  of the  second  depend  upon  the  shore  of sav-
ings  that  remain  within  firms  in  the  form  of profits;  that is,  they 
depend  upon  the distribution  of  income  given  the rote of growth.  A 
financial  structure is defined  by  the  weight  obtaining to the diff-
erent intermediaries and  capital markets  in  the  recomposition  of the 
dissociation  between  saving  and  investment. 
The  financial  structures of the  three  countries which  int-
erest  us  hod,  in  the  first  half of the  1960s,  a  common  characteristic 
that distinguished  them  from  those of the  Anglo-Saxon  countries:  no 
mely,  the  relatively greater significance of the  banking  system.  This 
was  due  to  the  limited existence,  within  the  European  financial  stru£ 
tures,  of non-bonk  financial  intermediaries and  in  particular of the 
so-called  "institutional investors"  on  the capital market  {Table I.l). 
Hence  the  preferences of holders of  financial  wealth  were  relatively 
concentrated  in  but  two  types  of financial asset:  on  the  one  hand, 
deposits  by  the  bonking  system  and,  on  the other,  bond- and  share-
holding.  This  characteristic was  accompanied  by  a  market  for  shares -5-
and  bonds  having  apparently  cont~dictory features.  The  Euro-conti-
nental market's  absolute  size  was  considerably smaller  (both  in 
terms  of the  value  of outstanding  securities and  of the  number  of 
firms  quoted)  in  comparison  to  those of the United  States and  of 
United  Kingdom  but  was  able,  nevertheless,  to  supply a  higher level 
of  financing  not  only in  relative,  but also in absolute,  terms  in 
some  cases  (Tables 1.2 and  3). 
The  Euro peon  roo rkets  lacked  that "fluidity" which,  as  is 
stated  by  O.E.C.D.  report  (O.E.C.D.  (a)),  is "a  combination  of cha-
racteristics difficult to classify,  which  comprise  active  competition 
between  financial  intermediaries,  a  broad  gamut  of instruments  for 
placing of issues and  providing  finance  available  for  savers  and  users 
of capital,  the  mobility of  funds  from  one  sector to another,  broad 
access  to  information,  etc."  but  which  certainly is in relation to 
the dimensions  of the  secondary market.  The  lack  of these  condit-
ions did  not  prevent  firms  from  raising relatively large  funds  by 
means  of the  issue of shares  and  bonds  (many  of which  were  purchased 
directly by  households)  but  limited  the  stability of the market  (na-
mely  its function  of rendering capital goods  into  more  liquid  form) 
and  its degree  of adaptability to the  needs  of  new  f~rms. 
The  economies  which  are  the object of our attention also  had 
in  common  a  'real' connotation that distinguished  them  from  the Anglo-
American  economies:  high  demand  by  firms  for external  financing.  This 
was  due,  as  Lamfalussy  has  demonstrated,  not  so  much  to  lower  profi-
tability in  comparison  to  firms  across  the Atlantic or across  the 
Channel,  but  rather to a  greater  propensity to invest  (younger  in-
dustrial structures rejuvenated  by  the  war). 
High  external financing  requirements  together with  the  do-
minant  role  of  the  banking  system  could  well  have  generated  disequi-
librium  in  the  industrial development  of the  European  economies. -6-
Table  I.1  Resources  of consolidated  financial  sector 
France  Germany  us 
(1960-64) 
UK 
(1962-65)  (1960-64)  (1960-64) 
Debtor  sectors 
1.  Capital Market 
2.  Banking  system 
3.  Public  sector 
(securities excl.) 
4.  Other  financial 
intermediaries 
(securities excl.) 
5.  Others 
11 
31 
9 
49 
100 
- 9 
35 
9 
65 
100 
15 
41 
18 
26 
100 
Source:  OCDE  Etudes  sur les marches  de  capitaux 
19 
51 
- 2 
15 
17 
100 
Table  I.2  Value  of outstanding securities  (billions dollars)1 
1964  1980 
us2  shares  633  1516,2 
bonds  114  490,4 
UK4  shares  72,9  160,8 
bonds  11,0  18,9 
France  shares  20,9  60,9 
bonds 3  10,4  92,0 
Germany  shares  5  48,5  11,2 5 
bonds  15,5  287,0 
Italy  shares  13  64,0 
bonds  131 1  91,6 
1.  Market  value  of domestic  and  foreign  securities issued  by 
private  and  public enterprises and  by  financial  institutions. 
2.  Private sector only.  3.  Private  and  public  sector (Central  Go 
vernment  excluded).  4.  Foreign  securities held  by  households  or; 
excluded.  5.  Year  1969. 
Source:  OCDE  Financial Accounts 
OCDE  Etudes  sur les marches  de  capitaux 
Italy 
(1964-65) 
22 
58 
20 
100 -7-
Table  I.3  Securities issues  (%  of GOP) 
60-65  76-80 
shares  bonds  total  shares  bonds  total 
us  0,41  2,87  3,28  0,63  6,51  7,14 
UK  0,  91  2,29  3,2  0,58  5,02  5,6 
France  1,02  1 ,42  2,44  0,63  2,28  2,  91 
Germany  1  0,71  3,05  3,76  0,44  5,16  5,6 
Italy  1 ,67  3,8  5,47  1,05  6,93  7,98 
1  Bonds-issues:  including Debt  Certificates  (loans against  borrower's 
notes  and  other non-bonded  loans  granted  by  insurance  companies). 
Source:  OCDE  Financial Statistics;  OCDE  National Accounts 
It was  this  problem  of theEuropean  financial markets  which  was  the 
subject of discussion  in  various  places during  the  1960s.  The  most 
frequently  proposed  solution  was  the  strengthening of the  bond  and 
share  market.  However,  the experience  of  the Anglo-Saxon  countries 
demonstrated  that  where  this market  was  well-developed  and  "fluid", 
firms'  requirements  for  external  financing  were  very limited.  This 
association,  regardless  of  the  direction  of causality,  indicates 
the objective  limits of the  capacity of  the  capital market  to  pro-
vide  firms  with  funds.  Even  if one  were  able to transfer,  by  magic, 
the American  financial  structure into the  European  continental eco-
nomies  one  would  still be  unable  to  meet  all firms'  needs(Lamfalussy(a)). 
The  solution  which  logically presented  itself was  that of 
marrying  the  superior  financial  capacity of  the  European  countries 
with  the greater "liquidity" of the Anglo-American  stock  markets. 
This  would  have  permitted  a  solution of  firms'  financing  problem 
which  while  providing risk capital would  not at the  same  time  shift 
their financial equilibrium to  a  higher  !eve~ of indebtedness.  In -8-
fact,  this solution  was  indicated  in  the  past  by  Lamfalussy  when 
he  hypothesised  a  massive  intervention  of the  banking  system  and 
of medium-long  term  financial  institutions  on  the  stock  markets. 
Today  we  can  confirm that this  path  has  been  followed  in 
none  of the  three countries.  Perhaps this was  because  the  proposal 
did  not  give  due  regard  to  the  motives  for  which  the industrial 
development  of these economies  had  not  already led  to  the  creation 
of stock  markets  with  Anglo-American  characteristics.  In  all three 
countries  the  banks  have  strengthened  their role  in  comparison  to 
the  mid  1960s  (Table  I.4).  On  the other  hand  there is no  doubt  that 
industrial development  has  continued  in  these  economies  at a  high, 
though  differing,  rate.  How  they might  have  been  able to reconcile 
the  two  trends,  how  in  other words  the three  systems  might  have 
found  their own  solutions to the  problem  of  financing  of  firms,  is 
the  basic  issue to  which  this report  addresses itself.  To  do  so it 
will reconstruct  the  recent  history of the German,  Italian and 
French  financial  systems. 
Table  I.4  :  Structural coefficients 
A  8 
t.Fin.assets of  fin.int.  AFin. assets of banks  A X  8 
~Fin. liab.of non  fin.  AFin.assets of  fin. 
sectors  int. 
65-67  78-80  65-67  78-80  65-67  78-80 
us  80,9  85,4  43,8  34,5  35,6  29,4 
UK  n.a.  88,1  32  1  3 
I  69,4  35  3  61 
France 1  85  3  92,9  48  2  3  55,1  41  o3  51,2  I  I 
Germany 2  81,2  95  80,7  82,3  65,6  78,5 
Italy  94,9  83,2  74,5  78,3  70,8  64,9 
1.  Including  "Credit Agricole"  but  excluding Saving  Banks. 
2.  Including  banking  special institutions. 
3.  1960-1964:  OCDE  Estimates 
Source:  OCDE  Financial Accounts (3) 
-9-
Banking  Legislation 
Whilst  the  three  countries  shared  common  characteristics 
so  far as the centrality of the  banking  system  was  concerned  this 
commonality did  not  extend  to  the legislative-institutional field. 
Here,  instead,  the  operation  of the  three  systems  was  different. 
Some  reference  to the  banking  legislation is necessary not  only to 
explain  the  working  mechanisms  of each  system  but  also to isolate 
the  specific  problems  and  illuminate  them  in  such  a  way  that  we 
can  interpret the evolution  of the  period  1965-1980. 
Today,  of the  three  banking  laws  presently in  force  :the 
Italian is the  oldest  and  also the  only one  which  has  not  been  mo-
dified  recently.  The  Italian  banking  law  of 1936  is also the  only 
one  of the three which  still shows  the  mark  left  by  the  Great  De-
pression. 
The  banking  crisis experienced  by  France during  the  1930s 
was  much  less  severe  than  those  in  theother  countries,  did  not  in-
volve  the larger and  more  prestigious credit organisations,  and  did 
not  prefigure  the  introduction  of  reforms  in the area  of credit le-
gislation.  Current legislation is based  on  laws  and  decrees  from 
the  years  between  1941  and  1946  and  on  the  modifications  introduced 
during  the  period  1966-1973.  This  legislation distinguishes three 
types of banks  which  are  obliged  to register with  the  "Conseil Na-
tional du  Credit"  and  are  thus  known  as  the  "banques  inscrites". 
These  are deposit  banks,  "banque  d'affaires" and  medium-long  term 
credit  banks.  These  categories of banks  were  obliged  to  follow  ex-
tremely strict rules  loosened  bv  the  1966-68  reform determining their 
respective  fields  of specialisation. 
Germany,  in  contrast,  experienced  a  banking  crisis of more 
than  modest  proportions  in  the early 1930s,  but this did  nothing 
to  shake  legislators 
1  coo v iction  as to the utility of the  mixed 
bank  which  indeed  has  recently been  re-affirmed  by  t~ Gessler Report. -10-
The  banking  law  promulgated  in  1934  maintained  the  credit structure 
based  on  the  mixed,  so-called,  "universal"  bank  and  the  law  of 
1961  (which,  with  the  modifications  added  in  1976  is still in  force) 
did  not  introduce substantial changes  leaving the institutional or 
ganisation  of credit to the initiative of the  bankers. 
Italian  banking  law  is again  somewhat  different,  belonging 
to a  series of measures  (the creation of I.M.I.  in  1931  and  of I.R.I. 
1n  1933)  aimed  at definitively eliminating the distortions generated 
by  the transformation  of the  'mixed'  banks  into  'holding•  banks.  It 
thus  constituted the  crowning  stage of a  movement  to radically alter 
the  regulations affecting the  credit  system.  The  banking  law  of 
1936,  which  with  the  modjfications  introduced  in  the  post-war era 
is still operative,  in effect constitutes a  set of norms  for  assign-
ing  powers  to direct and  control credit.  With  these  norms  one  cannot 
define  the  precise  shape  of the  banking  system as  in  the  French 
case  in  which  one  observes  a  distinction  between  deposit  banks, 
medium-long  term credit  banks,  and  "banques d'affaires"  (besides  the 
letablissements  financiers');  nor is it stated that the  normal  ex-
ercise of  banking activity may  include the  purchase of equity and 
the  granting  of medium-long  term  credit  {as  in  the German  case). 
On  the other  hand,  the  law  does  not  establish an  absolute  prohibit-
ion  against the  banks  entertaining relations with  firms  that  go 
beyond  short-term credit arrangements.  What  is sanctioned  however 
is the  principle ihat the credit  system  requires external  regulat-
ion.  The  law  derogates  to the  monetary authority the task of regulai 
ing,  both  through  active  intervention  and  passive  consent,  the  ways 
in  which  bank  credit  should  be  granted.  It is therefore  understand-
able that,  in  order to  describe those  banking  practices  compatible 
with  Italian law,  it is " •••  preferable to  avoid  the distinction 
between  British,  or  short-term,  "commercial"  banks  and  mixed  banks. 
It is  ~eferable to  resort to the  single  notion  of the ordinary - ll-
credit  bank  on  the  understanding that it is the  bankers,  and  if 
necessary the  monetary authorities,  which  define  the limits 
which  at any given  moment  have  to  be  observed  in  the  use  of de-
posits  by  the  banks."  (Saraceno).  This  notion  of "ordinary credit" 
is a  good  illustration of the  flexibility of Italian banking  law 
and  of the  key  role attributed to the central  bank.  In  short, it 
is the  central  bank  which  determines  what  it deems  to  be  an  op-
timal  financial  structure in  any  given  period  (Ciocca). 
The  importance of the  role attributed to the central  bank 
in Italy derives  from  motives  which  are different  from  those  which 
make  German  law  attribute to the  DBB  an  equally important  role. 
In  the German  case the accepted  principle is that the institutional 
organisation of credit must  be  left to the initiative of the  bankers. 
The  exercise of controls,  which  is very limited,  and  the  supervision 
are entrusted  not  the  central  bank  but  rather to a  special  body  no-
minated  by  the  government.  The  central bank's  main  task on  the 
other  hand  is to  undertake  the  function  of being  the  issuing  bank 
which,  by  acting absolutely independently,  guarantees tre  general 
conditions  for  the  functioning of the credit  system  and  especially 
monetary  stability. Whilst,  therefore,  in  Italy the importance  of 
the central  bank  derives  from  the  recognition  of the necessity for 
public  regulation of the credit  system,  in  Germany  the DBB  draws 
its authority  from  the opposite  philosophy:  that of guaranteeing 
the  conditions  for  the exercise of self regulation. 
Unlike  the Italian and  German  cases,  in which  the spirit 
underlying credit legislatjo n  has  hardly changed  over the last 
fifteen  years,  in  France  there  has  been  a  significant shift in 
the  "dirigiste" approach  which  the legislation of the  1940s  took 
towards  the credit  system.  The  decrees of 1966-68 constituted  a -12-
genuine  reform of the system  aimed  at  reducing  the  importance 
of the Treasury in the  supply of medium-long  term credit and 
decentralising decision-making.  The  law  of 1973  concerning  the 
Bank  of France constituted  a  decisive  step in attributing to it 
independent  responsibilities  for  monetary  policy.  Under  the 
preceeding  legislatUn,  the  Bank  had  been  in  a  position of mere 
executor of the  decisions  token  by  the  government. -13-
II.  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  THREE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEMS  IN  THE  FIRST 
HALF  OF  THE  1960s 
France 
The  French  financial  system of the  mid  1960s  had  three 
characteristic  features:  the  so-called  "cloisonnement"  of the 
financial  circuits;  the  reduced  role of the  banking  profession 
(as defined  by  the  laws  of  1941-46)  and  the dominant  position of 
the  public  sector in  the  management  of credit  flows. 
On  the  whole,  the  banking  system  had  a  considerably greater 
weight  in  the  French  financial  structure  than  those  in  the  Anglo-
Saxon  countries  but  a  lesser importance  compared  to those  in  Italy 
and  Germany  (Table I.1).  The  difference  in  respect  to these  two 
countries was  due  to the  exceptional  importance  of the  state's in-
termediation  activity.  This  intermediation  is  based,upon  the  "Tre~ 
sury circuit".  This  consists of three  channels  for  raising  funds:  d~ 
posits and  Treasury  bonds,  deposits  with  the  Post Office and,  espe-
cially,  the  funds  deposited  by  the  savings  banks  with  the Caisse 
Depots  et Consignations  (C.D.C)  (2).  Together,  these  three  channels 
accounted  for  a  flow  of  funds  to  the Treasury which  was  not  much 
below  the total volume  of  funds  which  flowed  to  the  "banques  inscri-
tes"  and  "special statute"  banks  put  together  (Table II.1). 
State  intermediation  was  focussed  most  of all in  the  field 
of "non-mobilisable"  medium-long  term credit.  Side  by  side with the 
intervention  of the  Treasury was  that of the "special institutes" 
(Credit National,  Credit  Foncier,  Caisse  Nationale des  Marches  de 
l'Etat, etc.),  which  are  institutions of a  public  and  semi-public 
nature  relying largely for  the  supply of  funds  on  the  purchase  of 
their bonds  by  the C.D.C. 
(2)  From  a  legal  point of view  Savings  Banks  do  not  belong  to the 
French  banking  system. -14-
Table  II.1  France:  funds  raised  by  financial  intermediaries1 
(percentage distribution) 
1966  1974  1981 
Banques  "inscrites"  37,4  44,2  35,9 
Banques  "a  statut special"  15,5  20,4  24,3 
Post  office accounts  8,6  6,5  4,6 
Saving  banks 
(Caisses d'Epargne)  26,6  24,8  29,7 
Treasury bills  11 '1  3,9  2,2 
Others  0,8  0,2  3,3 
100,0  100,0  100,0 
Sight,  term  and  savings deposits,  "bons  de  caisse",  and  Treasury 
bills,  Stock data. 
Source  :  Rapport  du  CNC  various  years. 
The  majority of  medium-long  term credit was  therefore  sup-
plied  through  the direct or indirect intervention  inthe  state  (Table 
II.2).  Despite  the  presence of a  category of  banks  specialised  in 
medium-long  term credit the  significance of the  banks  ~n this sector 
was  extremely limited  and  confined  almost  exclusively to  "mobilisable" 
credit  (3).  Even  the  very weak  market  for  fixed-income  bonds  was  do-
minated  by  the Treasury and  by  the  "special institutes". 
'.1/i th  exception  of the  "banques  populaires",  the  special 
statute  banks,  the  other large  segment  of the  French  financial  sys-
tem,  benefitted  from  tax  exemptions  and  privileges  on  interest  pay-
ments  to depositors.  These  banks,  and  in  particular the  forceful  and 
dynamic  Credit Agricole,  could  thus develop  behind  barriers  protect-
ing  them  from  the  competition  of the  "banque s  inscri  tes". 
(3)  This  peculiar  kind  of credit  may  be  rediscounted  by  the  Ban que 
de  France  on  authorization  by  the special credit institutions 
or the  C.D.C. -15-
Table  II.2  France:  credits to  the  economy  by  maturity and 
institutions (bill.  FF  and  % distribution) 
Short  term 
- Banque  de  France 
- Banques  inscrites 
- Banques  "a  statut special" 
Medium  term  "mobilisable" 
- Banque  de  France 
- Banques  inscrites 
- Banques  •a  statut special" 
- Special Credit  Institutions 
Medium  •non  mobilisable"  and 
long  term 
- Banques  inscrites 
- Banques  •a  statut special" 
- Special Credit  Institutions 
- Treasury 
1966 
103 
15,4 
100 
15,05 
85,4  82,9 
36,8  100 
7,9  21,5 
22,2  60,3 
6  16,3 
152,4  100 
12,9  8,5 
94,9  62,3 
44,6  29,3 
1974 
286,8  100 
65,9  22,9 
203,2  70,7 
80,3  100 
24,5  30,5 
43,6  54,3 
12,1  15,1 
566,4  100 
19012  3316 
326,4  57,6 
48,9  8,6 
Stock data.  Source:  Rapport  du  CNC,  various  years. 
1980 
509  I 1  100 
385,9  75,8 
92,6  18,2 
147,4  100 
111,0  75,3 
21,6  14,6 
11,3  7,7 
1416  100 
333,2  23,5 
298,0  21,0 
679,6  48,0 
31,1  2,2 
The  latter constituted  the third  part of the  system  and  was 
an  expression  of genuine  finance  (not  included  in  the  sphere  of  public 
administration  or in  that of corporative  interests).  This  segment  was, 
one  could  say,  "overwhelmed''  by  the  privileged circuits  (savings  banks, 
Credit Agricola  and  Credit  Mutuel)  and  it disposed,  during  the  mid 
1960s,  of little more  than  a  third of the  entire value of  funds  col-
lected  by  the  intermediaries.  The  reduced  importance  of the  "banques -16-
inscri  tes"  is a  structural  problem  in the  French  financial  system, 
dealt  with  but  not  resolved,  as  we  shall see,  by the  reform of 
1966-1968.  Here  it should  be  added  that the  four  large  nationalised 
deposit  banks  (three since the  1966  merger  between  the  Banque  Nati~ 
nale  pour le Commerce  et l'Industrie with  the Comptoir  National 
d
1Escompte)  while  belonging de  jure  to the  public  sector,  de  facto 
pursued  their activities on  lines very similar mthose of a  private 
bank.  Often,  in  fact,  they  had  common  interest with  private  "banques 
d'affc;Jires"  (Morin). 
In  the last analysis,  the  "cloisonnement"  of the  financial 
system  and  the  limited  role of the banking  profession  were  the  lo-
gical  consequence  on  the  one  hand  of social groups  (particularly 
the  farmers)  with  sufficient  power  to organise their own  priviledg-
ed  circuits,  and  on  the  other of a  particularly high  level of  pu-
blic intervention. 
Halfway  through  the  1960s,  the  French  financial  system 
presented itself therefore  as  a  highly structured  system of banking 
and  non  banking  intermediaries  (much  more  so  than  the Italian 
system  in  which  there  existed  neither "banques d'affaires",  financial 
credit  banks,  nor  even  the 
11etablissements  financiers")  but  suffering 
from  "cloisonnement"  and  a  level of  public  intervention  such  as  to 
suggest to  some  commentators  that it would  have  been  better adapted 
to  a  socialist economy  rather than  to  a  capitalist one.  It was 
especially on  this latter aspect of the  question  th-at  the debate 
preceeding  the  reforms  begun  in  1966  was  concentrated. 
At  first glance,the extraordinary importance of the  public 
sector in  the  credit  system can  be  ascribed  to  objective  factors  of 
a  "real" character.  The  high  rate of inflation experienced  on  a  con 
tinuous  basis  in  France  from  the end  of World  War  Two  until the  be-
ginning  of the  1960s  could  explain the  two  peculiar  phenomena  that 
have  conditioned  the  French  financial  system:  namely,  the  low  level (4) 
-17-
of the  propensity to  save  and  the  high  propensity of families  to 
hold  cash  ("Rapport  Lorain")  (Table 11.3).  The  appearance  of these 
phenomena  in  a  country already historically oriented  towards  an 
extensive  participation of the  state  in  the  economy,  and  endowed  by 
a  centralised  and  efficient  public administration,  could  explain 
the  importance  of  public  intervention as  a  guarantor of the  rational 
utilisation of available  savings  and  to make  possible  a  massive 
"transformation"  of liquidity into  financia 1  credit. 
Table  11.3  Households  financial assets  (percentage distribution) 
Q  1 
France  Germany  Italy 
1  960-65  197 6-80  1  960-65  1  97 6-80  1  964-65  1  97 6-80 
- Cash  and  bank  deposits  53,5  43,0  54,4  46,6  46,7 
•  cash  and  sight deposits  4912  1511  8,4  5  I 1  1916 
•  other deposits  413  27,9  46,0  41,5  2711 
- Securities  18,3  9  I 1  19,5  14,8  17,7 
- Other  28,2  47,9  26,1  38,6  35,6 
100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
1  Saving  banks  excluded 
Source:  OCDE  Financial Accounts;  OCDE  Etudes  sur les marches  de  ca-
pitaux;  Banco  d'Italia: Attivita e  passivita finanziarie 
del  paese 
A more  fundamental  investigation  shows  however  the effects 
that the legislation of 1941-45  and  the credit  policy in  the  follow-
ing  twenty  years  have  had  on  the distribution of deposits  between  the 
three sectors and  on  their liquidity. This allows  us  to  understand 
more  fully the  reforms  "raison d '@tre"  and  the  problems  that even 
now  continue to exist in  the  F~nch financial  system. 
6213 
32,0 
30,3 
2013 
17,4 
100,0 -18-
The  various  constraints  on  the  "banqt.e s  inscri  tes"  included,  for 
deposit  banks,  the  imposition  of  upper limits on  the  maturity and 
remuneration  of deposits.  These,  jointly with  a  tight  policy on  the 
opening  of  new  branches,  had  prevented  the  large deposit  banks  from 
effectively competing  with  the  "privileged"  circuits in the acqui-
sition of more  stable resources.  As  a  result,  the  function  that these 
banks  could  have  performed  in  changing  the  preferences of the  public 
towards deposits of longer-term maturity was  reduced.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  "ban que s  d 
1 affaires"  and  the  medium-long  term  credit  banks 
did  not  have  sufficient size or geographical  coverage  to  collect 
term deposits  or  savings deposits  in  competition  with  the  Saving 
Banks  and  with  Credit Agricole.  At  the  same  time,  the  issuing of 
fixed-interest  bonds  was  practically reserved  to the Treasury and 
to the  special institutes. 
The  massive  intervention of the state in  the  financing  of 
investment  was  therefore  not  due  so  much  to an  objective shortage 
of non-liquid  funds  arising  independently of the  behaviour of the 
financial  intermediaries,  but  rather to their distorted distribut-
ion  in  favour  of the  Saving  Banks  and  the 
11special statute
11  banks. 
Such  an  important  role of the  state in  the  collection of  funds  could 
not  be  considered,  at a  political level,  necessary  for  channeling 
resources  towards  the  investments defined  by  the  Plans  as  of priority. 
The  logic that  had  animated  the  nationalisations of 1945,  public  con 
trol of the  centralisation of capital and  of industrial sectors  was 
lost with  the  reduction  of  power  of the  Left,  and  it left behind  only 
its legislative shell.  In  reality,  from  the  period  of reconstruction 
onwards,  the effective  use  that was  made  of public  intervention  in 
the  financial  system  was  notably  below  that which  was  potentially 
feasible.  And  even  under Gaullist  "dirigisme" the extension  of  pu-
blic intervention  was  on  a  level above  that genuinely required  by 
planning. - 19-
The  basic  motive  for  the Debre  reform  (1966-68)  was  that, 
despite  a  lack of coherent  political support,  the  institutional 
pattern was  still conceived  in  the  interests of a  highly-developed 
form  of  public  intervention.  The  main  consequence of this contra-
diction  between  the institutional  framework  and  the  policy conducted 
within this  framework  was  that the  financing  of investment  took  on  a 
public  character even  when  it was  not  strictly necessary.  The  exist-
ence  of specialised  banks  in this field,  medium-long  term  credit 
banks  provided  for  by  the legislation,  were  not  sufficient to  signi-
ficantly involve  the  banking  system  in  financial credit.  The  "banques 
d'affaires",  while clearly per forming  an  important  role  in  the  inter-
penetration  between  finance  and  industry that  characterised  the  major 
private groups,  also  had  limited  im~rtance in  financing  credit  for 
the  private  sector,  which  had  easy access  to the  funds  placed  at 
their disposal  by  the  public  financial circuit. 
The  1966-68  reform of the  credit legislation,  preceeded  and 
accompanied  by  a  succession  of expert  investigations  (Lorain,  Com-
mission  Leca,  Marjolin-Sadrin-Wormser),  was  based  on  the  conclusions 
of the Commission  de  l'Economie  Generale et du  Financement  of the 
5th  Plan  according to which  it was  deemed  necessary to offer the 
banks  the  possibility of  playing  a  more  important  and  active  role 
in  the  financing  of investments,  while at the  same  time  reducing  on-
to an  equal  footing  the  intermediation activity of the Treasury. 
Given  that the deposit  banks  were  those  most  concerned  by  this  new 
line of  policy at the  beginning of 1966  a  decree  significantly re-
duced  the differences  between  their statutes and  those of the  "ban-
ques  d'affaires".  In  particular,  the  former  became  like the latter 
in  so  far as  they were  allowed  to receive  medium-long  term  funds. 
There  was  thus  a  reduction  inthe  protection  enjoyed  by  the 
priviledged  circuits,  especially the  Savings  Banks,  vis a vis  the 
competition  from  the  "banques  inscrites".  This  competition  was  also -20-
stimulated  by  the  abolition  of the  regulations  (a  "legal cartel") 
fixing  maximum  rates  paid  to depositors  and  minimum  rates offered 
on  loans  for  the 
11banques  inscri  tes
11
,  and  by  the liberalisation of 
the  opening of new  branches. 
A further series of  measures  aimed  at steering the  competi-
tion of the  "banques  inscrites" to the  privile,ged  circuits towards 
medium-long  term operations:  prohibition of remuneration  of sight 
deposits,  liberalisation of interest rates  on  fixed  term deposits, 
removal  of the  upper  limits on  returns to  savings deposits.  A reform 
of the  methods  of issue  and  placing of  fixed-income  bonds  aimed  at 
the  same  objective and  considerably  reduced  the  relative weight  of 
the Treasury.  Furthermore,  in order to allow  the deposit  banks  to 
widen  their activity in  equity participation,  one  previously the do-
minant  preserve of the  "banque  d'affaires",  there  was  an  increase 
in  the  maximum  limits of  participation with  respect  to their own  c~ 
pita! and  also that of the  other businesses  in  which  they  had  holdings. 
In  addition to a  group of  measures  aimed  at  modernising  the 
technical operations affecting  short-term credit there  followed  a 
thorough-going  reform of bank  re-financing  by  the  Bank  of France. 
This  reform  was  based  on  the  proposals of the  Marjolin-Sadrin-Wormser 
report.  This  reform  aimed  at  bringing about  the  creation  of an  effect 
ive  monetary  market  that  would  substitute  for the direct activity of 
the  central  bank  in the  area of re-discounting.  A crucial motive  for 
these  changes  was  to adapt  the domestic  system to those  of other 
countries with  a  view  to opening  up  the  French  financial  system. -21-
Germany 
The  German  financial  system,  in  contrast to those of Italy 
and  of France,  is characterised  by  the dominant  presence of the 
universal  bonk. 
It is a  well-known  fact that the  universal  bonk  offers the 
entire array of bonking  services  (acceptance of all type  of deposits, 
granting of both  commercial  and  financial credit,  ~rchase and  sale 
of securities,and  maintains  strong ties with  non-financial  businesses. 
The  latter ties take  a  number  of  forms  such  as  the acqusition  of 
shares,  the exercise of the depositors'  voting  rights and  the  pre-
sence of the  bonks
1  representatives on  the  Boards  of Directors of 
such  firms.  One  is not  dealing  here  with  a  specific category of 
"banking  firm"  defined  by  law,  as  in  the  case of the  "banques d'af-
faires"  in  France.  German  bonking  law,  in  fact,  neither sanctions 
nor defines  the  possibility of a  classification of banks.  Hence, 
the existence of the  universal  bank,  results  from  the  behaviour of 
the  bonking  profession within  a  legislative  framework  which  does 
not define  a  specific  pattern of specialisation.  This does  not  mean 
however  that there  do  not exist,  within  the  German  bonking  system, 
specialised  credit institutions which  offer only  particular services. 
Nor  does it mean  that one  will  not also  find  within  the  operations 
of the  universal  bonks  a  certain degree of specialisation.  Such  spe-
cialisation  however derives  from  the  choices  made  by  management  and 
not  from  constraints  produced  by  law. 
Credit  firms  belonging  to  private Commercial  Banks,  Savings 
Banks  and  Credit Co-operatives  sectors ore all considered  to  be  uni-
versal  bonks.  Although  they all supply the entire gamut  of  bonking 
services,  these  three  groups  of  banks  may  be  differentiated,  not  only 
in  relation to their respective legal  forms  and  administrative orga-
nisations  but also  by  business  structures. -22-
The  private  commercial  banks  (by which  one  understands·the 
large  banks,  the  regional  banks,  the  private  bankers,  and  the  fo-
reign  banks)  have  dominated  the  market  for  short-term loans  since 
the  1960s  (with  about  a  54%  market  share)  and  on  the  side of  liabilities, 
also that  for deposits  'on  demand'  (about  42%)  (Tables  II.4 and  5). 
Furthermore,  the  private  commercial  banks  were  and  still are,  espe-
cially the  three  largest  bank~c  (Deutsche,  Dresdner and  Commerzbank), 
closely tied  to  the  foreign  banks;  together they own  the_largest  part 
of the shares  that were  in the  portfolio of the German  banking  sys-
tem  (Immenga). 
Even  if the direct  presence  of the  commercial  banks  on  the 
market  for  medium-long  term credit was  modest  (10%  in  1965),  it 
should  be  remembered  that they also operated  (and  continue  to ope-
rate)  indirectly in this  market  through  private  mortgage  banks  (the 
main  activities of which  are  the  provision  of medium-long  term cre-
dit and  whose  form  of re-financing consists of the  issuing of  bonds). 
In  addition,  they also  used,  and  continue  to  use,  financial institut-
ions  specialising 1n  medium-long  term industrial credit  (the  main 
shareholders are  the  large  banks  and  the  most  important  Insurance 
companies). 
The  Savings  Banks,  mgether with  their central institutions 
(Girozentrolen),  which  also operate directly,  had  by  the  mid  1960s 
a  leading  position  in  granting  medium-long  term credit  (about  42%) 
and  also  in  receiving  savings deposits  (about  64%).  Furthermore, 
they owned  over  half of the  bonds  held  by  the  German  banking  system 
(above  all,  of debentures  issued  by  the  public  administration)  and 
they were  also  the  permanent  holders of shares  in  non-banking  com-
panies. 
The  other group of banks  with  an  universal  approach  to credit 
is the credit co-operatives,  whose  "de  facto  specialisation"  coo sist-
ed  of granting short- and  medium-term  loans. T
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By  the  middle  of  the  1960s  the  three  banking  groups  which 
constituted  the  system  of  universal  banking  had  total assets equal 
to 70%  of the entire  banking  system.  If,  furthermore,  one  takes  into 
consideration  the aspects  of  banking  services  which  do  not  appear  in 
their accounts  and  also the  "subsidiary relations" existing  between 
banks  with  a  universal approach  and  specialised credit institutions 
(mortgage  banks,  banks  for  financing  hire  purchase,  and  banks  with 
special  functions),  the dominant  position of the  universal  banks 
within  the German  banking  system  appears  self-evident.  This  position 
is reflected  in  the absence  of a  system of special  credit institut 
ions  comparable  to those  which  exist in Italy or even  in  France.  In 
1965,  banks  with  special  functions,  which  included  the  credit insti-
tutions  in  charge  of  financing  industrial investment,  granted  only 
7%  of the  medium-long  term  credit awarded  by  the  banking  system  so 
that this  item constituted  only 32%  of their assets,  while  a  greater 
proportion  (42%)  consisted of loans  to  banks.  One  can  see  confirmed 
in  this a  situation  in Germany  which  is opposite  to that of the 
Italian one  of "double  intermediation".  The  credit institutions with 
special  functions  were  (and  still are)  operational instruments  ~n 
the  hands  of the  banks,  a  situation considerably  diffe~ to that  in 
Italy where,  despite the existence of subsidiary relations,  there 
has  not  been  a  similar relation of subordination  between  banks  and 
special credit institutions. 
Even  public  intervention  in the credit arena  involved,  and 
continues  to  involve,  the  banks.  The  Kreditanstalt  fUr  Wiederaufbau, 
the  most  im~rtant credit institution  ~n  the  management  of  govern-
mental  financing  programmes  in  favour  of industry,  has  a  procedure 
for  granting credit which  allows  for  the  intervention of the  banks, 
to  whom  the  requests  for  financing  have  to  be  addressed.  What  one 
is dealing with  here is a  form  of-open  collaboration with  the  banks 
which  does .not  influence  their relative competitive  positions  and -26-
ensures  that the  Institute does  not  undertake  operations that other 
credit  firms  would  be  able  to  undertake on  their own.  A greater 
significance is attributable to  public  intervention  in  the  form  of 
guarantees,  obtainable  from  the Federal Government,  from  the  Lander 
and  from  local authorities.  It is these  g~rantees for  example  that 
have  allowed  the  emergence  of industrial credit  guarantee  syndicates, 
set  up  on  the initiative of the association of German  industrialists. 
These  syndicates do  not  grant credit as  such.  Rather,  they  play an 
intermediary role  in  so  far as it is the  banks  which  turn  to the  syn-
dicates  with  requests  for guarantees  for  advancing  loans.  The  Govern-
ment  and  the  Lander  then  grant  a  "re-guorantee
11  equal  to 80%  of the 
commitment  assumed  by  the  guarantee  syndicate.  The  investment  compa~ 
ies  for  small- and  medium-sized  industry,  while  remaining  private 
institutions,  also operate with  a  certain  amount  of  public  support, 
partly in  the  form  of financing  but  more  frequently as  g~  rantees 
underwritten  by  the Government  and  Lander. 
All this demonstrates  that  public  intervention  in  the  credit 
field  did  not  extend  to  the direct management  of  financial  flows,  as 
occurred  in  France  and,  to a  lesser degree,  in Italy,  but  took,  and 
continues  to take,  indirect  forms  through  banks  receiving  support  on 
those  investment  projects  which  ore deemed  by  them  to  be  of considerable 
risk. 
Although  family  savings  have  become  relatively highly-concen-
trated  in  two  groups  of non-bank  financial intermediaries  (Insurance 
companies  and  Savings Associations  for  Housing  Finance)  and  also in 
the  housing  market  this  has  only led  to  a  marginal  degree  of competit-
ion  in  relation to the  banks.  The  German  securities market  was  (and 
still is)  practically dependent  on  the  banking  system.  As  for  as  the 
shore  market  is concerned,  though  the  banking  system's  purchasing of 
shares is kept within  strict limits  (average  1960-65:  8,8%  of total 
shore  purchases),  the  banks  have  always  had  a  preponderant  role  in -27-
the  floating  of  public quotations,  which  inGermany  requires  the  in-
volvement  of a  bank,  in order to manage  underwriting of new  issues 
and  their sale to  investors.  The  issuing syndicate is normally com-
posed  of a  group of banks  (especially large  private banks  and  also 
the  central institutions of the savings  Banks)  which  sell a  large 
proportion  of the  shares  underwritten to their own  clients.  The 
fixed-income  bond  market  was  (and  still is) dominated  by  banking 
debentures  (70%  of the  debentures  1n  circulation)  (Table  II.6). 
Table  II.6  Germany  :  Bonds  by  issuers and  holders  (percentage 
distribution) 
France 1  German~  I  tal~ 
1964  1980  19652  1980  1964 
Issuers 
- Public  sector  83,0  78,0  21,7  23,9  43,1 
•  Gen.  Gov.  23,3  15,9  25,1 
- Non  fin.priv.enterpr.  17,0  22,0  7'  1  0,8  10,4 
- Banks  and  other fin.int.  71,2  75,3  46,5 
1980 
59,4 
49,5 
0,8 
39,8 
100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
Holders 
- Banks  n.a.  45  33 
' 
40,1  28,6 
- Other fin.int.  n.a.  12,6  15,6  3,2 
- Rest  of the  world  n.a.  3'  1  4,1 
! 
- Non  fin.  enterpr.  n.a.  3,9  5,0  48,2 
- Household  n.a.  22,8  23,9 
- Other  n.a.  12,3  11,3  20,0 
1.  Public  sector includes  issues of special credit institutions.  Pri-
vate  sector includes  issues of  financial institutions  with  public 
statute. 2.  Source:  Monthly  Report  of DBB.  3.  1971 
Stock data  Source:  OCDE  Financial Accounts 
57,5 
2,7 
18,3 
21,5 -28-
During  the  mid  1960s  measure  were  taken  against the  inflow 
of  foreign  capital seeking  to acquire German  bonds.  It was  at this 
time  that it became  evident that although  the  foreign  sector had  the 
ability to guarantee  a  degree  of stability on  the  German  housing 
market,  the  market  for  bonds  was  highly dependent  on  the  banking 
system.  In  other words  what  was  lacking was  a  network  of  investors 
willing or able to  guarantee  stability. 
The  mild  competition  from  the  Insurance  companies  and  the 
Savings Associations  towards  the  banking  system  in  regard  to their 
financing  of  housing  is demonstrable  by  analysing  the actual  relations 
existing  between  them  and  the  banks.  The  largest  investments  by  the 
Insurance  companies  consist of loans  in return  for  bonds  issued  both 
by  firms  and  by  banks  (DBB,  Monthly  Report  Jan.  72).  Since it is only 
large  industrial  firms  which  have  direct relations with  the largest 
Insurance  companies,  whilst  to a  large extent  industrial bonds  are 
distributed  by  the  banks,  the  Insurance  companies  end  up  being  eli ents 
of the  banks  themselves;  not  only  because  of their accounts  with  the 
banks,  but  also  because  of their  purchases  of  banking  and  industrial 
bonds  as  well  as  of shares.  If,  moreover,  one  also cmsider the  fact 
that over two-thirds  of the  bonds  held  are  banking  bonds,  then  it  b~ 
comes  evident to  how  high  a  degree  the  Insurance  companies  perform 
the  task of channeling  funds  to  the  banking  system. 
The  Savings Associations  for  Housing  Finance  also  had  (and 
have)  close ties with  the  banking  system,  not  only  because  "banking 
deposits"  had  not  inconsiderable  weight  in their asset structure  (al-
most  30%),  but  also  because  a  large  number  of these institutions were 
{and  are)  departments  of the Girozentralen,  of the  Savings  Banks  and 
of various  mortgage  banks  that the  Bundesbank  defines  as  "parent 
institutions"  (DBB,  Monthly  Report  Dec.  1966). 
One  can  add  that  by  the  middle  of  the  1960s  the  three  large 
banks  and  some  other  commercial  banks  began  to  supply "personal  mort--29-
gage  loans",  which  were  more  easily obtainable  than  those  offered  by 
the  Savings Associations  for  Housing  Finance,  who  required  a  minimum 
sum  of savings  and  a  short  time  period  in  which  to determine  whether 
or not  to allocate a  loan  to an  applicant;  procedures  which  effecti-
vely limited  the  competitive  capacity of such Associations in  compa-
rison  with  the  banking  system that  can  supply the full array of ser-
vices. 
As  far as  the competition  within  the  banking  system itself 
is concerned,  the  universal approach  tocredit  practice,  together with 
the  existence in law  of  free  access  to  credit activity,  have  been  the 
cause  of  in~se competition  between  the  banks  which  since  1967,  follo~ 
ing  the  complete abolition of controls  on  the  rateof interest,  has 
become  acute. 
Italy 
The  distinctive character of the  Italian  financial  system, 
as it appeared  in  the  middle  of the  1960s,  without doubt  consisted of 
the credit specialisation which  assigned  the task of  providing  invest-
ment  finance  almost  exclusively to the  "special credit institutions". 
This  specialisation constituted  the  pivot  for diversification  between 
intermediaries.  The  range  of different kinds  of  intermediary was  thus 
narrower  than  that existing  in  France,  where  alongside  the  "special 
institutions",  organised  on  similar lines to those  in Italy,  there 
also existed  various other  kinds  of bank  and  "etablissements  finan-
ciers".  In  effect,  the  Italian  system was  based  solely on  two  types 
of intermediary:  the  banks  and  the  "special credit institutions". 
The  first  kind  include,  it is true,  various different categories of 
banks  (National  Interest Banks,  Public  Law  Credit Institutes,  ordinary 
banks,  popular  banks  and  co-operatives,  savings  banks,etc.)  that are 
distinguished  in  terms  of their ownership,  legal status and  geographical -30-
coverage,  but  much  less in  terms  of their specialisation. All of them 
in  fact,  with  some  differences,  are  substantially deposit  banks 
and  "ordinary credit"  banks. 
Not  even  the  fact  that  the largest  banks  belong  to the 
public  sector  (Public  Law  Credit Institutes) or to the  system of 
state participation  (the three National Interest Banks,  COMIT,  CREDIT 
and  Banco  di  Rome)  implied  substantial differences  in  behaviour. 
The  "special credit  institutioos" are  non-bank  intermediaries 
specialised  in  medium-long  term industrial  finance  (IMI,  Medlobanca, 
Efibanca,  Centrobanca,  Mediocredito,  Isveimer,  Irfis,  CIS,  etc.), 
housing  finance,  agricultural  finance  and  public  works.  They  are  most-
ly publicly-owned,  or controlled  by  credit  firms  which  in  their turn 
belong  to  the  public  sector or the state participation sector.  The 
legislation did  not define other  forms  of intermediary such  as  invest-
ment  banks,  finance  companies  and  investment  funds. 
Between  these  two  types  of intermediary defined  by  the  law 
codifying credit specialisation,  banks  had  a  dominant  position  in 
the  collection of deposits  (Table II.7).  This  role  was  accentuated 
in  the  post  war  period.  The  total number  of credit  fims  remained  vir-
tually unchanged  between  1947  and  1965;  what  has  altered  is the  rela-
tive weight  of  individual categories.  The  direction  taken  by  the  mo-
netary authorities in the  post  war  years  had  the  effect of reducing 
the  significance of ti-e  three National  Interest  Banks  and  of encoura.s. 
~ng competition  in  the relations  between  these  and  other  banks.  One 
can  see this trend  in Table II.8,  where,  in  particular,  the develop-
ment  of  savings  bank  deposits  should  be  noted.  Although  the Italian 
savings  banks  are  public  law  institutions whose  presidents are  nomi-
nated  by  the Treasury Minister,  they do  not  belong to the  state fi-
nance  circuit as  is the  case  in  France.  Rather,  the  growing  importance 
of the  savings  banks  has  to a  significant  extent  been  at the  expense -31-
of the  state~s own  collection of  funds  via  trePost Office,  and  thus 
in  competition  with  the Treasury circuit which,  as  in  France,  in-
cludes  postal deposits  and  "Casso  Depositi  e  Prestiti"  (a  parallel 
institution of  Caisse  Depots  et Consignations). 
The  development  of  the  banking  system  as  a  whole  priviledg-
ed  some  categories of  bank  at the  expense of others.  The  category 
that was  sacrificed,  namely  the  Banks  of National  Interests,  was, 
for  reasons  of tradition  (ex-mixed  banks)  and  geographical  concen-
tration,  in  close contact with  the  productive  sphere  and  in  particu-
lar,  the  industrial sector of the  economy.  The  banks  which  received 
privileged_  treatment  with  regard  to their opening  of branches  were 
more  "deposit-oriented"  than  "credit-oriented".  Funds  raised  in  ex-
cess of  the  lending capacity were  channeled  into the  purchase  of  bonds 
or onto  the  inter-bank market  which,  as  a  result,  expanded  rapidly 
(De  Cecco). 
This  "deposit oriented" attitude was  to  remain  a  constant 
tendency  in  the Italian  banking  system;  a  tendency not  hindered  or 
prevented  by  the  monetary authorities and  intensified  by  the  behaviour 
of individual credit  f»ms  which  were  always  oriented,  at least until 
recently,  to  maximising  deposits  by  means  of reciprocal  competition 
on  interest rates offered  to  depositors. 
Already  by  the  beginning of the 1960s,  the  contradiction 
which  was  becoming  evident  in the Italian  financial  system was  that 
existing  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the dominant  position of  banks  in 
the  financial assets of the  public and,  on  the  other,  the  limitations 
imposed  on  the  use  of their assets,  in  particular,  as  medium-long 
term credit.  In  large part this contradiction was  resolved  by  the 
characteristics assumed  by  the  system of special credit. 
The  shape  of  the  special  c~dit system,  as it presents it-
self today,  was  nearly completely  formed  during  the  period  from  the -32-
end  of the  war  up  until the  beginning of the  1960s.  With  the  except-
ion  of I.M.I.,  the  institutions operating  predominantly in  the  field 
of industrial  financing  were  nearly all founded  during this  period. 
But  the  large  part of them  was  set  up  to  favour  public  intervention. 
At  the  same  time  their number  was  very  much  higher  than  in  the other 
two  countries.  The  existence of a  large  number  of these  credit insti-
tutions,  which  still continues  today,  was  due  to overlapping  between 
the  policy lines decided  by  the  state,  on  a  geographical  and  sectoral 
basis,  and  the  company  growth  targets of the  individual  banks  inte-
rested  in  expanding  their activities. 
The  importance  of public  intervention  in  the activities of 
the special  credit institutions can  be  con firmed  from  the weight  of 
subsidised  credits in  the total value of their lending  (Table II.9) 
and  also  from  the  geographical distribution of credit employed  in 
the  years  (1962  and  1963)  of  high  investment  activity by  firms  in 
the  "industrial triangle" of Northern  Italy.  During  this  period 
credits advanced  in  north  west  Italy were  not  more  than  40%  of the 
total.  This  comparison  shows  that  the  supply of credit  by  the  spe-
cial credit institutions was  determined  not  by  demand  (concentrated 
in  the  industrial triangle)  but  by  the  steering of  funds  towards  the 
targets of the  public  intervention.  Moreover  a  major  part of the 
non-subsidised  credit was  directed to  large-sized,  private or state-
owned,  enterprises,  as  a  result of the natural  propensity of large 
credit institutions  (such  as  IMI  and  Mediobanca)  to  favour  big  in-
vestment  projects  and  cor~ora±Wn restructuring. 
One  can  therefore  conclude  that the  medium-long  term credit 
system that  had  been  established during  the  period  of maximum  accumu 
lotion of  indus trial capital left largely unsatisfied  the  demand  for 
non  subsidised  credit arising  from  that  group of small- and  medium-
sized  firms  that  had  been  the  principol actors  in  the industrial de-
velopment  process.  This  demand  naturally turned  to the  banks  operating (6) 
,- 33-
in  the  areas of industrial development  which,  by  tradition,  were 
inclined  to  entertain relations with  the  business  world  and  which 
were  also able to supply assistance  for  companies  engaged  in  fo-
reign  trade.  These  banks  largely satisfied these  financial  needs  by 
granting credit advances  that were  'working capital'  only in  a  formal 
sense. 
Thus  the  coo cept  of "ordinary credit 
11  came  also to  include 
finance  for  investment  (Mattioli,  Confalonieri).  The  banks  substan-
tially filled  the  gap  which  had  been  formed  in  the  supply of non-
state-backed  loans. 
A further  consideration  emerges  from  the  analysis of the 
sources of  funds  of special credit institutions.  Only  a  minor  pro-
portion  of  funds  were  raised  by  term deposits.  The  biggest  proport-
ion  of  funds  was  raised  through  the  issue of bonds.  The  placement  of 
bonds,  whilst  competing  with  firms'  sales of direct issues  - which 
in Italy as  in  the other two  countries  have  always  been  rather limit-
ed- did  not  compete  with  bank  deposits.  Instead,  with  respect to the 
banks  the  bonds  issued  by  the  special credit intitutions were  an  im-
portant  form  of employment  of  funds.  In  e·ffect,  in  1965,  the  special 
credit institutions derived  about  40%  of its funds  directly from  the 
public,  about  35%  from  banks  and  the  remaining  25%  from  the  public 
administration. 
Credit specialisation was  thus  consistent with the  maintenance 
of a  key  role  for  the  banking  system;  this being  made  possible  by  the 
two-way  relationship that tied  the special institutions to the  banks. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  banks  supplied  funds  to  the credit institutions 
by  acquiring  bonds;  on  the other,  the supply of credit of these  insti 
tutions was  such  as  to allow  the  banks  to  provide  a  portion  of  finance 
for  inves.tment. 
This  consistency was  made  possible  by  the.special meaning 
that  bankers  and  the  central  bank  attributed to "ordinary credit". -34-
Here  one  already  sees  the  importance  of the  role of the  Bank  of 
Italy.  Not  only ore its powers  much  broader than  in the other two 
countries,  but at the  same  time its discretionary  powers  allow it 
to establish those  models  of banking  practice which  in Germany  re 
sult  from  the  "free"  behaviour of the  banks  and  in  France  (parti-
cularly before  the  Debre  reform)  from  credit legislation. -35-
Table  II.7  Italy:  Funds  raised  by  financial  intermediaries1 
(%  distribution) 
Banks 
•  sight dep. 
•  other dep. 
Special Credit Inst. 
•  dep.  &  dep.  cert. 
•  bonds 
(bonds  held  by  banks  ) 
bonds  held  by  public 
Post Office Accounts 
Gov.  bonds  and  Tr.  bills 
1965 
69,6 
(45,5) 
(54,5) 
11 ,4 
(20,2) 
(79,8) 
(  0,77) 
14,0 
5,0 
100,0 
1974 
76,2 
(55,7) 
(44,3) 
11,9 
(26,2) 
(73,8) 
(  1,84) 
9,4 
2,5 
100,0 
1980 
71,9 
(52,5) 
(47,5) 
4,15 
(45,0) 
(55,0) 
(  6,6) 
8,6 
15,35 
100,0 
1  Sight,  term  and  saving deposit,  deposit certificates,  bonds  and 
Treasury bills held  by  households  and  not  financial  enterprises. 
Stock data.  Source:  Banco  d'Italia: Attivita e  Passivita Finanzia-
rie del  Paese. 
Table  II.8  Italy: Deposits  and  credits  by  categories of banks 
(%  distribution) 
1947  1965  1981 
dep.  cred.  dep.  cred.  dep.  cred. 
Public  Law  Credit Inst.  2311  24,9  22,5  25,1  1911  1911 
National  Interest Banks  23,9  24,1  18,2  22,4  1211  14,9 
Ordinary  ba'nks  22,2  22,2  22,1  22,0  25' 1  28,9 
Popular & cooperative  banks  11,2  9,9  11 ,4  10,4  16,0  14,5 
Savings  banks  19,6  18,9  25,8  20,1  27,7  22,6 
100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
Source:  Banco  d'Italia,  Bollettino -36-
Table  II.9  Italy  :  Credits to the  economy  of  banks  and  special 
institutions  (%  distribution) 
1965  1974  1981 
Banks  62,1  58,3  6313 
•  short-term  (8712)  (8712)  (81 1  9) 
•  medium-long  term  (1218)  (1218)  (1811) 
Special Credit  Institutions  3719  41,7  36,7 
•  industry & public  works  (6010)  (71105)  (6510) 
of which  - subsidised  (39  1  1 )  (39  1 1)  (3116) 
•  others  (4010)  (28195)  (3510) 
100,0  10010  10010 
Source:  Banco  d'Italia1 Bollettino e  Relazione del Governatore - 37.-
III.  REAL  TRENDS  IN  THE  THREE  ECONOMIES 
Before  giving consideration to the evolution of the three 
financial  systems it is useful to recall the  three  economies'  pri~ 
cipal trends. 
The  most  important  common  characteristic was  the transition 
from  a  phase  of strong  growth  to one  of constrained  and  unstable 
growth,  during  the  1970s.  The  fall of the  average  rate of growth  of 
investment  has  not,  to any dramatic extent,  diminished  the  proport-
ion  of G.D.P.  devoted  to accumulation.  The  latter has,in all three 
countries,  remained  at a  level higher than  that  in  the  U.S.A.  and 
in Great  Britain  (Table III.l}.  Firms'  profit margins  have  everywhere 
shown  on  initial fall  followed  by  a  recovery after 1975;  public  spend 
~  -
ing  as  a  share of G.D.P.  has  everywhere  increased. 
If ones  considers  various  other questions  however,  the general 
trend  of the three economies  differs.  Observing  the  trend  of invest-
ment,  one  notes  an  almost  uninterrupted  phase  of expansion  in  France 
between  1965  and  the  beginning  of 1974.  In  Italy,  there  was  an  in-
terruption  in  1969-70  followed  by  an  extremely rapid  recovery  between 
1972  and  1974.  Germany  witnessed  extraordinary growth  in the  period 
1968-71,  but  the  recession  began  earlier than  elsewhere,  in  1972.  The 
three countries  became  synchronised  during  the  deep depression  of 
1975.  The  subsequent  recovery was  slower in Italy and  France,  faster 
in Germany.  Here  there ore three main·distinctive  features  of the 
three economies:  the  rate of inflation which  was  particularly high 
in Italy and  low  in  Germany;  the  uninterrupted  surplus  of the German 
current  balance of  payments  between  1966  and  1979 and  the  massive  ca-
pital inflows  from  abroad;  the  structural negative  savings  position 
of the  public  sector in  Italy. 
These  phenomena  have  had  a  notable  influence  on  the  condit-
ions  in  which  the three  financial  systems  have  worked.  Above  all else, -38-
the  amount  of intermediation  has  expanded.  On  the one  hand,  at 
least until  1976,  the  fall in  the  share of profits  has  been  faster 
than  the  fall  in  the rate of accumulation.  On  the other,  there  has 
been  the  problem  of  financing  the  public debt:  in Germany  and  France 
there  has  been  a  transition  from  a  situation of substantial equili-
brium  to  one  of deficit:  in Italy the deficit  has  expanded. 
Table  III~1:  Investments  as  a  percentage of G.D.P.  (constant  prices) 
1965-70  1970-75  1975-80 
United  States  19.4  18.4  17.1 
United  Kingdom  20.7  20.5  18.1 
France  23.3  24.1  21.9 
Germany  23.7  23.0  22.5 
Italy  23.9  22.6  19.3 
Source:  OCDE  National Accounts 
In all three countries the conditions  in  which  intermediation 
activity has  to be  carried  out  have  become  more  critical.  In  short, 
the  degree  of uncertainty has  increased  in  the  face  of sharp exchange 
rate and  raw  material  price  fluctuations,  crises of certain industrial 
sectors  and  reconversion difficulties and  major  fluctuations  in  stocks, 
the  most  volatile component  of investment.  Risks  of financial  insta-
bility have  increased  with  banks  failures,  both  in Germany  where  the 
central  bank  has  adopted  a  very  severe  monetary  policy and  in  Italy 
where  it has  taken  a  softer line. 
The  comparison  of  financial  balances  shows  (Table III.2) the 
extraordinary volume  of families'  financial  savings  in Italy (equal 
to nearly three times  those  in  the other countries).  The  financial 
deficit that,  obviously,  has  to counter-balance this surplus  mainly 
arises  not  in  firms  but,  rather,  in  the  public  sector.  The·  share of 
this deficit in G.D.P.  is anomalous  compared  to the  position  in other -39-
countries.  The  reasons  for  this particularity of the Italian  financial 
system  are  hence  to  be  found  largely in  the  relationship between  the 
public  sector and  the  family  sector.  Public  expenditure  in  Italy 
largely consists of current expenditure which  contributes to  fami-
lies' disposable  income.  The  inadequate  level of revenue  from  direct 
taxation  has  brought  into  being a  mechanism  whereby  the  public  sec-
tor's current deficit is largely covered  by  families'  financial assets. 
The  increase in interest rates  has  turned  this mechanism  into a  vi-
cious circle continually raising the  burden  of debt  service. 
Table III.2  Financial  balances  (%of G.D.P.) 
1965-67  1970-72  1977-79 
D  F  I  D  F  I  D  F 
Households  3.5  3.2  9.3  4.6  4.0  11.7  3.7  5.0 
Corporations  -2.8  -3.9  -2.5  -4.6  -4.2  -4.3  -0.9  -4.3 
Public Sector  -0.6  0.8  -4.1  -0.1  0.9  -6.9  -2.9  -1.5 
Rest  of the  world  -0.3  -0.2  -2.6  -0.4  -0.4  -1.3  -0.7  0.3 
Source  :  National Accounts. 
I 
14.6 
-3.0 
-9.9 
-1 .7 
The  tendency  for  the  public  sector  financial deficit to  grow  is 
common  to all three countries.  In  contrast,  in  Germany  and  Italy,  firms' 
deficits registered  a  fall during  the last three  years  considered  1n 
the Table.  This,  however,  took  place in Germany  together with  a  rate 
of capital· accumulation  (I/Y)  averaging  a  level equal to that of the 
three  years  1970-72,  whereas  in Italy this fell  by  nearly 4%.  In  Fran-
ce  there  was  no  significant  reduction  in  firms'  financial deficit 
despite a  drop in the  rate of accumulation. (7) 
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IV.  THE  MAIN  FEATURES  AND  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  THREE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEMS 
OVER  THE  LAST  15  YEARS 
IV.1  France:  Reform  of the Credit  System. and  Support  for  Industrial 
Development 
Sustained  and  stable growth  and  the  "rupture" of 1974 
There  are three  "real" characteristics regarding  trends  1n 
the  French  economy  which  it is helpful to recall before  examining 
changes  1n  the  financial  system. 
In  the  first  place,  France  began  a  phase  of accelerated  capit-
al  formation  after 1965  which  continued  until 1974,  the  year of what 
the  Franch  call "la rupture",  after which  private  investment  entered 
a  phase  of stagnation that is still continuing  today.  France was 
"late"  in  comparison  to Germany  and  Italy,  which  during  the  1950s  had 
already experienced  a  process of accelerated  growth.  This  "late" de-
velopment  in  France  was  notably stable.  The  trend  in  French  invest-
ment  was  characterised  neither by  the  long  cycle  experienced  by  Germa-
ny  between  the  second  half of the  1960s  and  the early 1970s,  nor  by 
the  short  and  frequent  Italian cycles. 
In  the  second  place,  during  the  1960s  France  had  an  average 
rate of inflation  considerably higher than  in  the other two  countries 
and  in  the  1970s  this rose  although  not,  as  in  the Italian case, 
dramatically.  With  respect to Germany,  France,  which  was  used  to  in-
flation,  felt  the  inflationary shock  less. 
The  accelerated  growth  and  the stability of the  French  econo-
my  during  the  first  phase  (ie.  until 1974)  was  not  the  fruit of  for-
tuitous circumstance.  Rather,  this was  the  key  objective of economic 
policy  both  under De  Gaulle  and  Pompidou.  According  to the  political 
philosophy of the  General,  industrial  modernisation  was  supposed  to 
serve  France  by  bringint  her  into a  competitive  position  on  the  world 
market  and  by  developing  strategic sectors of her domestic  economy, -42-
both  of which  conditions were  necessary in order to  sustain  the· pri-
mary  role that the  country  had  assumed  in  international  politics. 
In  Pompidou's  more  liberal approach it was  intended  to  use  a  rapid 
growth  in  productivity to  maintain  the  Government's  social  concensus 
and  to limit domestic  social conflict  (Gigliobianco  - Salvati). 
Even  though  De  Gaulle's  philosophy implied  a  large  element 
of "dirigisme",  the acceleration of industrial development  was  not 
meant  to  be  based  on  an  extension  of the  public  sector.  The  state•s 
influence  was  supposed  to  be  exercised  through  the  planning  process. 
This  was  intended  to  induce  private enterprise to collaborate  ~n 
achieving  the  growth  targets defined  at a  political levele 
The  collapse of  "pure"  Gaullism  was  subsequently translated 
into  a  decisive orientation towards  free  enterprise.  This  was  en-
trusted  the  task of investing according to the  usual  market  crite-
ria.  With  the  Barre  Government  this orientation acquired  particulaE 
ly more  vigour. 
Support  for  capital accumulation  without  an  extension  of the 
public  sector is therefore  the  lowest  common  denominator  linking the 
three administrations  (De  Gaulle,  Pompidou,  Giscard),  during  the 
period  from  1965  to  1981. 
In  the  fin.ancial  field,  structural changes  arising  from  the  re 
forms  of 1966-68 accompanied  this  political will  to  sustain  the de-
velopment  of  productive  investment.  In  a  certain  sense  these  reforms 
constitute the  "liaison"  between  the  "real" and  the  financial aspects 
of the  system.  It is therefore  convenient  to analyse  the  evolution of 
the  financial  system  in  the light of these  reforms. 
Reforms  of the  Financial System 
We  have  already mentioned  the  motives  for  the  1966-68 reforms. 
Around  the  middle  of the  1960s  the objective  that  emerged  was  mainly 
that of reducing  the Treasury's  intermediation  in  order to  leave  more -43-
space  to  the  banks.  The  5th  Plan  expressly  provided  for  a  diminut-
ion  of medium-long  term  credit awarded  through  the Treasury and  an 
expansion  of the  bank's  role  in  this sector.  In  the  financial are-
na  it thus  carried  out  a  liberalisation which  preceeded  by  some  years 
those  that the  Pompidou  administration  was  to  promote  on  the  •real" 
front. 
In  relation to this target,  the  reforms  showed  themselves 
to  be  extraordinarily effective. Within  six years  the  share  of 
"non-mobilisable"  credit awarded  by  the  banks  quadrupled,  rising to 
about  35%  of the  total,  the relative weight  of the Treasury  being 
accordingly reduced.  In  this  period  therefore  a  good  proportion  of 
investment  financing  was  outside  the Treasury circuit, decentralised 
to  the  banks,  and  in  particular the  "banques  inscrites"  (Table II.2). 
Important  structural modifications affecting the  banking 
profession  accompanied  this development  in  the  field  of medium-long 
term credit.  For  many  "banques d'affaires
11
,  this legal status,  which 
carried  with it a  number  of  special obligations  (for example,  surveil-
lance  by  a  government  officjal) was  no  longer  advantageous  given  that 
in  terms  of the  business  which  the  banks  were  authorised  to  handle 
they were  now  in  the  same  position  as  the deposit  banks.  For  this 
reason  there  was  a  drastic ill! in  the  number  of  "banques d'affaires" 
in  the  years  following  the  reform  (Fournier).  On  the other  hand,  the 
nationalised deposit  banks  had  moved  closer to  the  model  of the  bank 
"a  tout  faire",  moving  through  relations  with  the  special institutions 
and  through  the acquisition  and  development  of specialised  banks. 
Large  nationalised,  and  private,  banks  thus  operated  in  the 
same  area,and  where  this was  worthwhile,  collaborated.  Nevertheless, 
important differences  remained.  These,  as  will  be  seen,  are  fundamental 
both  to  understanding  both  monetary  policy and  the  motives  for  natio-
nalisation.  The  private  banks  did  not  have,  in  their origins as 
"banques d'affaires",  a  sufficiently wide  base  of deposits  to  raise -44-
the  funds  that  they were  in  a  position  to lend.  Despite  a  decisive 
strategy of deposit  expansion  (Paribos  and  Indo  Suez  assumed,  by  the 
end  of the  1960s,  control of two  banks  holding  many  branches,  Cre-
dit du  Nord  and  Credit Industriel et Commercial)  the  private  banks 
remained  net  borrowers  on  the  money  market  whilst the  opposite  took 
place  in  the  case of the  nationalised deposit-bonks.  Moreover,  the 
latter continued  to  be  reluctant  to  purchase equity participations 
in  non-financial  firms  thus  only making  partial use of the  opportu-
nities which  the  new  legislation offered.  The  reform  provided  a  sti 
mulus  to competition,  specially from  the  "banques  inscrites" vis a 
vis  "special statute"  banks.  The  former  have  profitted abundantly 
from  the  new  liberal regime  concerning  the  opening of branches.  As 
this liberolisation was  accompanied  by  the  prohibition of the  remu-
neration of "sight" deposits,  competition  was  brought  to bear  through 
the acquisition,  by  the  "banques  inscrites" of various other  forms 
of deposits.  However,  it is only  from  the  Savings  Banks  that the 
"banques  inscrites"  succeeded  in  winning  a  further  market  share:  in 
fact,  the Treasury,  in  correspondence  with  the  reform's  objectives, 
performed  a  voluntary retreat vis a vis  acceptance  of deposits.  The 
"banques  inscrites" lost ground  however  in  relation to the  special 
statute  banks  and,  in  particular,  to Credit Agricole  (Table 11.1). 
As  far as  the  "banques  inscrites" liabilities are  concerned, 
there was  therefore a  strong shift  from  "sight" deposits  to  term  and 
saving deposits.  In  this respect,  the  reform  has  also  had  success  in 
inducing that  consolidation  of deposits that ought  to accompany  the 
expansion  of medium-long  term  banking activity.  However,  a  more  de-
tailed  examination  reveals that  the effective duration of the  more 
widespread  forms  of deposits  was  relatively short and  that,  given 
the  banks'  failure  to  develop issues of bonds,  the  "burden  of trans 
formation"  was  relatively high  (Gaudichet,  Conseil National  du  Cre-
dit 1976  and  1977).  On  the  other hand,  one  can  see that the  bonks 
succeeded,  on  the  whole,  in  securing a  high  and  sufficiently stable -45-
supply of medium-long  term credit to  firms.  This  means  that  monetary 
policy has  made  these  two  phenomena  compatible. 
Monetary  policy has  thus  been  constrained  in its attempts 
at stabilisation,  by  the  need  to  avoid  critical situations  in  the 
banks'  accounts  and  by  that of guaranteeing the  regularity of  finan 
cia!  flows. 
Monetary  Policy 
Of  the  two  variables,  money  supply or interest rates,  which 
in  line of  principle a  central  bank  can  use  to exercise its control, 
the  Bank  of France  has  emphasised  the latter (Raymond,  OECD  (b), 
Coutiere). 
Two  reasons  can  be  used  to explain  this  behaviour:  the  first, 
that  we  will  not  investigate  here  in  any detail,  is that of maintain-
ing  a  stable rate of exchange;  the  second  derives  from  the  structure 
of the  financial  system. 
From  the  financial  balances it can  be  seen  that,  in  France, 
intermediation arises substantially between  only two  sectors:  families 
and  firms.  The  credit  system is thus  dominated  by  firms'  financing 
requirements  which,  to a  large extent,  are  met  through  the  banks.  Be-
fore  1971,  the  latter refinanced  themselves  through  rediscounting 
with  the Central  Bank,  whilst after this date  the  money  market  began 
to  be  substituted  for direct re-discounting. 
On  the  whole,  the  banks'  supply of liquidity from  the  French 
money  market  is based  on  transactions with  the Central  Bank~nd with 
the C.D.C.)  and  not  primarily with  the  public  as is the  case  in  coun-
tries where  there exists a  wide  circulation of  public securities.  To 
a  large extent the  French  market  consists of bills admitted  for 
discount  by  the  Bank  of France,  bills representing "credit mobilisa-
ble"  as  well as Treasury  bonds  and  securities issued  by  the  special -46-
institutions  (4).  The  French  monetary authority considers  that  in 
such  a  system  a  rigorous  and  direct control of money  supply would 
be  impossible  without  making  the  system  highly unstable  (Raymond, 
Coutiere). 
Given  that the  banks  cannot  recover liquidity by  selling se-
curities to  the  public  on  the  money  market  any  reduction  of re-financ 
ing  by  the Central Bank  would  make  it difficult  for  them  to  satisfy 
their reserve  obligations.  Wide  interest rate variations,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  not  be  compatible with  the  heterogeneity of the 
French  banking  system in  which,  as  has  been  noted  already,  many  banks 
are  structurally dependent  on  the  money  market  for  the  collection of 
funds.  Sharp interest rote  movements  on  the  money  market  would  ge-
nerate effects of different  signs  and  intensity for different  banks 
which  would  rebound  on  their incomes  (Joffre-Strauss Kahn,  House  of 
Commons).  Moreover  strong interest rate variations  were  considered 
by  the  French  monetary authority as  unwanted  shocks  that  impede  the 
capital accumulation  process. 
Not  being able,  therefore,  to control  monetary expansion di-
rectly through  bank  liquidity nor indirectly by  means  of.major shifts 
in  interest rates,  the  French  monetary authorities  have  combined  an 
interest rate  policy with  control of the  principal determinant  of  mo 
netary expansion,  namely  bank  credit  provided  to the  public.  When  con 
trol  based  on  the  interest rate  no  longer  helped  to  relieve inflation 
monetary  expansion  was  controlled  through  "l'encadrement du  credit", 
instrument  introduced  on  a  temporary  basis  on  various  occasions  from 
the  end  of the  1950s  on,  and  which  became  permanent after 1972. 
In  the  years  between  the Debre  reform  and  the  Borre  Plan, 
French  monetary  policy has  been  based  on  a  "fine tuning"  aimed  at 
(4)  Since  1973  the  money  market  has  been  organised  into  two  depart-
ments.  The  first is the  Banque  of France  department  where 
transactions are  carried  between  the  central  bank  and  financial 
institutions.  The  second  relates to intra  financial institut-
ions  transactions. -47-
sustaining a  steady growth  path  and  containing  inflationary pressu-
res.  This  policy,  that  has  achieved  a  relatively high  rate of 
growth  of investment  paying  a  relatively low  cost  in  terms  of in-
flation,  has  required  a  series of regulations  which  have  been  ac 
companied  by  some  reform. 
In  the  field  of credit control,  "l'encadrement",  introduced 
on  a  temporary  basis  in  1969-70,  was  to  be  re-adopted  in  1972  with 
a  "corset"  regime  based  on  the  consitution of obligatory reserves 
to  match  credits granted  in  excess  of  the  monthly limits  on  credit 
expansion  fixed  by  the  Bank  of France.  This  instrument  has  been 
employed  in  a  selective  manner  in  order to limit,  or exclude,  effects 
on  investments  and  exports. 
With  regard  to the  question  of  bank  re-financing,  a  large 
part of the  Marjolin-Sadrin-Wormser  report's  suggestions  have  been 
put  into effect.  This  has  allowed  a  considerable  reduction  in  the 
practice of the Central  Bank  rediscounting  in  favour  of the develop-
ment  of a  money  market  with  a  strong  secondary  component.  This  transit 
ion  from  rediscounting to negotiation of securities and  titles to 
credit on  the  money  market  has  been  encouraged  by  the  practice  follow 
ed  by  the  Bank  of France  in  maintaining  its intervention  rate 
below  the  discount  rate.In order to  prevent  access  to the  money  market 
from  leading to an  undesirable  expansion  of those  banks  structurally 
indebted  to this  market,  and  in  order to assimilate the  position of 
these  banks  to  that of those  with  a  high deposit/credit ratio,  in 
1971  obligatory reserves  on  credits were  introduced,  alongside  those 
on  deposits. 
Finally, it is necessary to recall that,  thanks  to  the  in-
fluence  that the three  large nationalised deposit  banks  haveon  the 
Association  Fran~aise des  Banques,  the  French  monetary authorities 
have  available to them  a  special channel  through  which  to  limit 
the  repercussions of interest rate  fluctuations  on  the  cost  of  bank 
credit.  On  a  number  of occasions  when  there  has  been  a  strong in-
crease of the  rate  on  the  money  market  the  bank  base  rate  has  been -48-
kept  below  this  through  the  actions of "moral  suasion"  on  the  na-
tionalised  banks  by  the  Ministry  for  the  Economy.  In early summer 
1982  the difference  between  the  two  rates was,  for  example,  about 
2  points. 
"A  Financial Road  To·Growth  ?" 
One  can,  therefore,  arrive at the  conclusion  that,  so  far 
as  concerns  the  period  1965-74,  capital accumulation  in  France  has 
been  encouraged  by  structural transformations  of the  credit  system 
and  by  a  monetary  policy highly attentive to  firms'  credit require-
ments.  Nevertheless,  it remains  to  be  seen  whether this  policy orien 
tation  aimed  at  providing  support  to  accumulation  through  the  mani-
pulation of credit  has  forced  the  French  economy  into what,  in  the 
Italian case,  has  been  called  "the  financial  road  to growth"  (An-
dreatta).  This  consists in  forcing  economic  growth  towards  an 
11ar-
tificial"  process of accumulation  that  has  the  ultimate effect of 
inducing  firms  into a  position of increased  financial disequilibrium. 
At  first sight, it would  seem  that this  has  also  been  the 
case  in  France.  As  has  already  been  shown,  the  period  from  the  second 
half of the 1960s  until the  present day  can  be  subdivided  into two 
phases.  The  first,  one  of accelerated  accumulation,  continued  until 
the  beginning of 1974;  the  second,  which  began  in  1974,  was  marked 
by  a  critical situation  in  firms'  financial  accounts  and  by  stagnat-
ing  investment  (Table IV.1). 
Nevertheless,  with  a  more  thorough 'investigation this "first 
sight"  impression  shows  itself to  be  unfounded.  As  a  result of the 
sustained  process  of capital accumulation,  that  had  made  it possible 
to achieve  continual  gains  in  productivity,  firms•  profitability did 
not  fall appreciably until 1974.  The  drop in  profits was  registered 
concomitantly with  the depression of 1974-75. T
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On  the  other  hand,  the  structure of  firms•  financing  was 
kept  in  equilibrium until 1974  by  a  contribution of  sel~financing 
approaching  50%  and  of medium-long .term  liabilities of about  25%. 
This  indicates that the  financial  system  had  not  worsened  firms• 
indebtedness  nor  had  it oriented  such  indebtedness  towards  short-
term  borrowing.  Firms'  financial  equilibrium  broke  down  in  1974 
when,  at the  beginning of the  recession,  firms  proceeded  to  massive 
speculative  stocking.  Falling  profits  provoked  by  the  recession  led 
to very  heavy  recourse  to  short-term  banking  indebtedness.  Entering 
into the  heart of the  recession  (1975)  in  conditions  which  were  al-
ready critical vis a vis  indebtedness  with the  banks,  firms  drasti-
cally reduced  the  level of investment  and  began  a  process  of  financ-
ial stabilisation  by  substituting medium-long  term credit  for  bank 
overdrafts  (INSEE  1976).  The  policy of reflating the  economy,  ini-
tiated  in  the  autumn  of 1975,  stimulated  demand  through  the  manipu-
lation of the  Budget  and  support  for  family  incomes  helping  to re-
equilibrate  firms'  accounts.  However,  this  policy was  not  maintained 
for  a  sufficiently long  period  to  give  results  because  of the  pro-
ductive  capacity created  by  the  preceeding  expansion. 
By  the  end  of 1976  Barre's deflationary policy took  place. 
The  ensuing  "freeing" of  prices  enabled  profits to recover  but  did 
not  succeed  however  in  stimulating a  resumption  of investment.  What 
has  been  called  the  "rupture of 1974"  in  the  French  accumulation  pr~ 
cess  was  caused  by  the  same  factors  that affected  the other advanced 
economies.  The  financial  system  seems  to  h~ve adapted  itself to  the 
requirements  of the  high  level of industrial  growth,  experienced 
between  1965  and  1974,  without  provoking  "feerfback  effects"  on  firms' 
behaviour. 
Monetary  and  financial  policy during Barre's  government 
The  1974-75  crisis in  France  hit  an  economy  whose  experience 
of sustained  and  stable  growth  was  rather exceptional  among  the  O.E.C.D. -51-
countries.  The  economic  policy  imposed  by  the  Barre  government  de-
rived  from  an  awareness  of  this  particuliarity and  from  that of the 
necessity to  reabsorb the effects of the  "oil shock".  At  the  basis 
of the  turnabout  of economic  policy introduced  in  1976l  there  were 
substantially two  orders of consideration.  The  firstreferred  to the 
capacity of the  French  economy  to return  to  the  rates of growth  and 
accumulation  which  had  been  experienced  previously.  In  effect,  it 
was  hardly thinkable  to  return  and  stick to  the  pre-crisis growth 
path,  notwithstanding the optimistic  forecasts  of the 7th  Plan 
(Bloch-Laine);  this not  only  because of the  constraints arising  from 
foreign  payments  balances  but  also,  and  most  importantly,  because  of 
the  dimensions  already reached  by  the  national  productive  apparatus. 
The  second  order of considerations  related  to  the  fact  that the  con-
solidation of France's economic  position  in  international competition 
required  a  stable exchange  rate.  To  this end,  re-balancing of exter-
nal accounts  was  essential and  therefore  became  a  primary target.  In 
order to achieve this target Barre  chose  an  internationally credible 
policy instrument  capacble of sustaining France's international cre-
dit:  the  fixing  and  publication of monetary expansion  "targets",ac-
cording to what  was  rapidly spreading as  economic  orthodoxy,  parti-
cularly in  Germany,  the  economically strongest  country in  the  E.E.C. 
The  readjustment  of another set of accounts,  namely  those of 
public  finance,  is  probably better to  be  considered  as  a  complement 
to the declared  monetary  orthodoxy rather than  as  a  primary objective. 
The  "exceptional"  public  sector deficit that Barre  programmed  to  re-
duce  did  not  exceed  2,5%  of G.D.P.  and  was  largely  justified  by  the 
adverse  trend  in  revenues  owing  to the  collapse of the  level of ac-
tivity following  the crisis.  On  the other  hand,  the  Barre  government, 
while it reduced  direct state intervention  in  accumulation,  allowed 
public  investment  to expand  at a  relatively sustained  rate  (almost 
14%  per annum  in  the  period  1975-80),  especially through  the  contri~ 
bution  of nationalised  firms.  Despite  what  the  ideology  proclaimed -52-
by  Barre  would  have  us  believe,  there  has  been  no  significant  "rup-
ture"  in  the  previous  tradition of support  for  accumulation  not  by 
means  of a  budget deficit  but  through  the  composition  of  public 
spending. 
Within  this  framework,  the  slogan  of the  Barre  government, 
the  struggle against  inflation,is to  be  seen  primarily in  relation 
to  the external  balance.  The  emphases  put  on  the  social effects of 
inflation constituted  rather a  means  to  promote  the  internal accep-
tance  of the  new  course  of policy. 
The  Barre  policy's liberal character,  that emerged  in  the 
so-called  "second  phase"  of application of his  programme  (price  con-
trols were  abolished  in  1978  after twenty-five  years  of application), 
was  based  on  confidence  in  the  resumption  of private  investment  follow 
ing  a  rise in  profitability. It is  precisely this assumption  which 
has  been  the  real  failure of the  programme:  the  attainment  of the 
third  readjustment  (balancing of  firms'  accounts after the  balancing 
of  foreign  accounts  and  of  public  budget,did  not  lead do  a  resumpt-
ion  of accumulation.  This  drove  the  government  to  make  a  whole  series 
of stimulatory interventions  to which,  on  the  whole,  there  was  no 
significant response  and  which  often  contradicted  the  "liberal" 
spirit of the  programme. 
What  have  been  the  effects of Barre's  policy on  the  French 
financial  and  credit  system?  To  what  extent  can  one  speak  of an  ef-
fective  change  of course  in  comparison  to  previous  experience? 
At  the  level of monetary  policy the  change  is more  apparent 
than  real.  The  financial  structure  remained  unchanged  and  policy has 
therefore  continued  to be  based  on  control of credit demand  rather 
than  on  that of supply  (OECD  (c),  Fr8chen-Maarek).  Even  before  the 
autumn  of 1976,  when  it was  decided  to  publish  monetary targets,  mo 
netary  policy required  forecasting  of the  expansion  of money  supply 
in order to  fix  the maxima  for  the  "encadrement  du  credit".  With  the -53-
Barre  programme  these  forecasts  were  made  public  to exploit the 
"publication" effect,  especially at an  international level.  Never-
theless the  preoccupation  with  preventing  sharp  fluctuations  in  the 
rate of interest remained,  even  though,in  conformity with the  obje£ 
tive of readjusting  foreign  balances,  the  conduct  of monetary  policy 
was  oriented  less towards  "fine tuning"  and  more  towards  medium-term 
stabilisation. 
Interventions relative to  the  functioning  and  structure of 
the credit  system  can  be  reduced  without  excessive exaggeration  to 
a  single aim:  the  re-launching of  private accumulation  in  competi-
tive conditions.  With  the Barre  government  one  registers a  systema-
tic challenge  to the  previous  industrial growth  policy and  to  the 
relationship between  this  policy and  the  credit  system.  Symptomatic 
in this  respect~ the draft of the  Hannoun  report.  This  was  based 
on  a  retrospective analysis of the  priviledged  credit concessions 
given  to  priority sectors.  It strongly argued  the  advantages  of  mo~ 
ing  from  a  sectoral industrial  growth  policy to  the creation of con-
ditions  in  which  the  most  efficient  firms  could  emerge  spontaneously 
and  in  which  it would  be  the  capacity to  produce  competitively,  ra-
ther than  the  choice of  product,  that would  be  rewarded.  The  multi-
ple  initiatives  (in  1978,  in  1979 and  in  1980)  aimed  at  stimulating 
the  creation of  new  firms  and  the development  of the  small  and  medium-
sized  ones,  were  part and  parcel of this  project.  Regional  develop-
ment  objectives were  also oriented  towards  private initiative,  stim~ 
lated  and  assisted  by  public  and  semi-public  institutions.  To  this 
end,  the  "Mayoux  report"  puts  forward  evidence  for  the  necessity to 
review  the  policy of the  banking  system  (and  in  particular of the 
nationalised  banks).  These,  it argued,  are  inclined to  use  local 
branches  only  for  deposits while  transmitting decisions relative to 
lending  to Paris,  even  for  relatively modest  credits.  The  consequent 
centralisation of credit,  both  geographically  (in the  principal fi-
nancial centres and,  especially,  in  the  Paris area)  and  by  sector -54-
(the  priviledged  position  of large  firms)  is accused  of  being  an  im-
portant  obstacle to the  promotion  of regional  development  via  the 
activity of smaller  companies.  The  "Monory  law"  ("Measures  for  orien!, 
ing  savings  towards  the  financing  of  firms"  in  1978)  was  directed 
to the  strengthening of  firms'  self-financing,  again  with  the objec!, 
ive of stimulating investment. 
As  a  result of legislative intervention  between  1966  and  1972 
the  French  financial  and  credit  system appeared,  on  the  eve  of the 
1981  nationalisations,  very different in  comparison  to  fifteen  years 
before.  The  main  guidelines  on  which  this structural intervention 
policy was  built were  the  opening  of a  much  wider  possibility for 
action  by  the  three  large  state  banks,  a  stimulus  to competition  wit~ 
in  the  banking  system,  a  reduction  of the Treasury's  intermediation 
role  and,  more  generally,  "de-provincialisation" of the  whole  system. 
Some  results  were  achieved  rapidly,  others  remained  as  permanent  pro-
blems. 
In  the  field  of medium-long  term  credit the  reduction  in  the 
Treasury• s  intermediation  role  in  favour  of the  "banques  inscri  tes
11 
was  extremely rapid.  So  far  as  deposits  were  concerned,  however,  while 
initially the  "banques  inscrites
11  gained  ground  in  comparison  to  the 
Savings  Banks,  the latter subsequently re-asserted  themselves.  This 
was  also  true of Credit Agricole  which,  thanks  to  dynamic  management, 
continued  to  exploit its priviledges.  In  the  summer  of 1978  the Asso-
ciation  Fran~aise des  Banques  sent a  strongly-worded  memorandum  to 
the  Government  with  regard  to  the  "priviledged circuits" and,  in  pa!. 
ticular,  Credit Agricole  (AFB).  It underlined,  amongst  other things, 
the  fact  that this bank's  priviledges enabled it to achieve  a  level 
of deposits  well  above  the  needs  for  credit of the  category of borrowers 
that it served;  furthermore,  it allowed  of the  existence of a  double 
intermediation  circuit that exploited  the  "banques  inscrites'" requi-
rement  for  funds  through  the  placement  of the  excess deposits on -55-
the  money  market.  An  accord  was  reached  in  November  of  the  same  year, 
and  approved  by  the Cabinet,  on  the  basis  of which  two-thirds  of Cre-
dit Agricole's  profits were  subjected  to  the  same  company  taxation as 
that  paid  by  the  banks.  In  return,  Credit Agricole  was  allowed  to 
enlarge its field  of operations,  operating  in  conditions  closer to 
those  of the  "banques  inscrites".  Even  after this initiative however 
the  "cloisonnement"  of the  credit  system  remained  one  of  the  main 
structural  problems  inherited  by  the  Mitterand  administration. 
Despite  this last characteristic  the~e cannot  be  any doubt 
that,  during  the  1970s,  the  French  financial  system  has  been  "de-
provincialised"  by  means  of a  considerable  opening  up  of the  system 
in  its relations with  abroad.  The  principal  channels  for  this inter-
nationalisation  process,  furthered  by  certain  French  foreign  policy 
initiatives,  were  the development  of export credits and  increased 
recourse  of large  firms  to  credit on  the  xeno-currency markets. 
The  Mauroy  government's  nationalisations 
I 
The  transformations  induced  by  the  policy  followed  towards 
the  French  financial  and  credit  system appeared  to  be  dominated 
by  the objective  of adapting it to  the  need  to  sustain a  high  level 
of capital accumulation.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  was  a  constant  preo£ 
cupation  of governments  in  the  period  that  we  have  examined.  The  Bar-
re  government,  that  tempered  a  monetary  policy aimed  at sustaining 
France's  international  prestige with  various  initiatives aimed  at 
promoting  investment,  was  no  exception  to this rule.  The  French  fi-
nancial  and  credit  system  has  thus  gradually moved  towards  a  struct 
ure  which,  with  respect  to  the  1960s,  was  intendet to  be  virtually 
independent  of Treasury  intermediation  and  to  be  based  on  the  co-exis 
tence  of a  mixed  bank  system with  public  special institutions,  de-
centralised  so  as  to collect and  develop entrepreneurs•  energies 
whereever  they appeared.  According  to  the  Mauroy  government's  offi 
cia! declarations,  the  intention  mthe  nationalisations was  to  en-
courage  this tendency. -56-
The  nationalisation of  the  banking  system  has  brought  under 
the  state's control about  90%  of the  "banques  inscrites'  "  branches 
accounting  for  88%  of their deposits  and  78%  of their loans.  The  Go 
vernment's  slogan of "banalization  et decentralization"  signifies a 
committment  to  continuing  to work  for  a  unification of the  conditions 
in  which  the  "banques  non-inscrites"  and  the  "banques  inscrites" 
operate.  (The  A.F.B.  thus  has  a  new  reason  to ask  for  protection 
from  the  priviledged circuits,  namely  that of representing state 
property).  Decentralisatioh of credit  functions  is also  implicit  in 
the vast governmental  programme  of regionalisation. 
One  of the  ideas  guiding  bank  nationalisation is that of 
stimulating  investment  financing.  It is believed  that the  expansion 
of  the mixed  banks,  already encouraged  by  preceeding  policies,  can 
be  accelerated  by  means  of the  "state mixed  banks".  The  pressures 
on  the  banks  to  assume  participation  in  firms,  exercised  in  the  spring 
of 1982,  should  be  understood  in  this context.  The  coupling of the 
state mixed  bank  with  large  state-owned  industry  (which  itself has 
been  expanded  by  the  nationalisation  of large  private industrial 
groups)  is intended,  according  to  the  logic  underlying  nationalisat-
ion,  to  increase  capital accumulation  eliminating the  uncertainties 
concerning  reinvestment  of  profits and  availability of external  financ 
ing.  The  long  phase  of stagnation of private investment,  the  main  fai-
lure of Barre's  policy,  is thus  expected  to  end.  If,  in  this respect, 
the  Mauroy  government's  nationalisation objectives are  the  same  as 
traditional French  policy over  the last fifteen  years,  the  question 
about  their efficacy still remains. 
From  the  strictly economic  point  of view  the question  is sim£ 
ly that of the  coherence  between  the  socialist government's  economic 
policy and  the  shape of the  credit system.  To  the  thesis according  to 
which  the credit  system  inherited  from  the  preceeding administration 
was  incoherent  with the  new  economic  policy one  can  oppose  an  evaluat-
ion  of the experience of the last  fifteen  years.  This  experience does -57-
not testify in  favour  of the  necessity of nationalising the  banking 
system.  There  do  not  seam  to  have  been  structural constraints  on  capi 
tal accumulation  either during  the  strong  previous  expansion  or 
during  the  following  phase  of  stagnation.  The  latter can  be  explained 
by  two  causes:  the  restrictive  impact  of economic  policy and  the  pre-
sence  of a  large,  recently-created  productive  capacity in  French  industry. 
In  order to stimulate  investment  a  reflationary strategy using 
the  classic  (in  France)  instruments  of  public  investment  programmes 
financed  by  public  intermediaries  might  have  been  ;ust as  successful 
as  nationalisation.  There  is some  reason  to  believe that  the  path  fol-
lowed  by  the  Mauroy  government  is less effective  in  stimulating accu-
mulation  that  the  former  alternative.  In  the  short  term,  the  nationa 
lisations  have  certainly been  an  element  in  reducing  the  international 
acceptability of France's  "against-the-stream"  policy of reflation. 
Being  exposed  on  many  fronts,  and  particularly in  the  field  of struc-
tural reforms,  loss of international credibility has  prevented  the  so 
cialist government  from  succeeding  in  adopting  the  kind  of  "Keynesian" 
policy,  used  during  many  turbulent  periods  of the  1970s;  a  policy which 
even  the  Barre  government  abandoned  only  in  part. 
At  the  structural level one  may  only advance  hypothetical  co~ 
siderations.  In  the  period  that  we  have  examined,  the French  economy 
has  been  managed  by  a  highly  integrated  public  and  private  power  elite 
operating  in  both  industry and  finance.  The  Mauroy  government's  natio-
nalisations  have  obviously affected  this.  If,  in  the  short  termi,  this 
elite were  to  be  transformed  so  as  to  force  accumulation  there  would 
then  be  the  risk of entering  a  "financial  road  to  ~rowth" analogous  to 
that experienced  in  Italy.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  government  aban-
doned  a  use  of the  reforms  for  short  term  political objectives,  while 
they would  have little immediate  effect they would  nonetheless  consti-
tute a  decisive  turning-point  ~n the approach  of the  French  credit  sy~ 
tern  to  a  "finance  - industry"  model  that  could  have  the  positive  cha-
racteristics of a  mixed  bank  together with  the  guarantees  constituted 
by  a  state ownership. -58-
IV.2  GERMANY  THE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  AND  ANTI-INFLATIONARY  POLICY 
A hypothesis  on  the  motives  for  anti-inflationary policy 
German  economic  policy is distinguished  from  those  of the 
other two  countries  by  its decisively anti-inflationary imprint  which, 
for  the entire  period  from  the  mid  1960s  until  today,  has  allowed  Ger-
many  to  achieve  one  of the  lowest  rates of inflation in  the  world. 
During  this  same  period  Germany  has  assumed  an  hegemonic  role  in  the 
world  economy  which  is,  without doubt,  connected  to  the  fact  that Ger 
man  industry  has  become  the world's larges exporter and  that the  cur-
rent  payments  balance  has,  for  a  long  time,  accumulated  a  major  surplus. 
The  characteristics which  the German  economy  has  assumed  in 
the last fifteen  years  raise questions  about  the  conditions  that  have 
enabled  the  achievement  of  remarkable  results and  the  possible  motives 
underlying  the  particular emphasis  attributed  to  the  struggle against 
inflation.  Re-examination  of the  particular conditions that lie at the 
base  of the German  growth  model  are outside  the  terms  of reference of 
the  present  report.  As  far as  concerns  the  motives  for anti-inflatio-
nary  policy it is  possible to  make  three  important  observations.  The 
first is related  to  the  high  degree  of concentration  in  German  industry 
and  to  the weight  of the largest industrial groups  in total exports. 
The  second  refers  to  the  interpenetration  between  banks  and  ind~stry, 
which  can  be  described  as  " •••  the  headquarters  of large industrial 
and  banking  capital that  represents  a  powerful  centre of monopolistic 
control  over the  German  economy"  (Dal  Bosco).  The  third  observation is 
in  reality a  hypothesis,  namely,  that relative  price stability is one 
of the  principal conditions  for  the  functioning  of the  German  univer-
sal  banks. 
As  concerns liabilities,  universal  banks  receive  both  short-
and  medium-long  term  funds.  As  for assets,  they offer the entire  range 
of  financing  needed  by  firms,  from  working  capital to  equity shareholding. -59-
With  a  high  rate of inflation there is inevitably a  shortening of 
maturities  on  the  side of liabilities that necessarily imposes,  in 
a  prudential sense,  modification  in  management  criteria by  the  banks. 
In  Germany  this could  have  brought  about  the  birth of new  financial 
intermediaries,  or  public  intervention  in  the  management  of  financial 
flows  (House  of Commons).  One  is thinking  here  of France or Italy, 
where  the  high  inflation rate  has  hindered  institutions  financing  in-
vestments  from  raising medium-long  term  funds  from  the  public  and 
where  the  problem  of transformation of maturities  has  been  resolved 
through  the direct or indirect intervention of the  state  (France),  or 
by  means  of the double  intermediation circuit,  functioning  thanks  to 
banking  administrative  regulation  by  monetary  authorities  (Italy). 
If this hypothesis  is reasonable,  it is  possible  to  sketch 
an  analysis  in  which  the  primary  role assumed  by  the German  economy 
is closely tied  to the  working  of a  restricted  group of industrial 
firms,  tied  in its turn  to the  universal  bank  system which  functions 
to deter inflation delegating  the essential maintenance  of monetary 
stability to  the central  bank.  This  particular structure of bank  -
industry relations contains,  however,  a  contradiction,  at least as 
far as  monetary  stability is concerned.  If,  as  he  happened,  safeguard 
ing  of price stability requires  a  strongly restrictive monetary  policy 
this can  hinder the  growth  both  of industry and  of the  banks. 
Monetary  policy 
The  low  rate of inflation which  has  characterized  the  German 
economy  has  been  obtained  by  means  of a  compresion  of demand  which 
led  to a  slowing-down  of growth.  During  the  periodo  1973-77  German 
GOP  grew  at an  average  rate  lower  than  that of the other countries 
though  in  1978  there was  a  significant recovery.  In  the  period  1973-77 
the ratio of gross  fixed  capital  investment  to  GNP,  which  until 1972 
had  been  at a  level higher  than  in  France  and  Italy,  fell  sharply, -60-
while  in  the last  four  years it has  recovered  achieving  higher levels 
even  than  France.  German  economic  policy  has  run  ahead  of that of the 
other countries.  A deflationary line was  adopted  earlier and  with 
greater  firmness. 
The  German  monetary  authorities  have  been  called  the  "hard 
money  men  from  the  continent".  The  main  justification for this  renown 
lies in  the  severity of the  restrictions which  monetary  policy  has 
applied  in  the  struggle to achieve  or maintain  monetary stability. 
This  is first element  which  distinguishes German  from  Italian or 
French  monetary  policy. 
During  the  period  of concern  to  us  here  the  years  in  which 
the Deutsche  Bundesbank  (DBB)  took  the  firmest  line on  monetary  re-
strictions were  1966,  1973  and  1981. 
In  1966,  a  year  in  which  rapidly rising domestic  demand  has 
led  to a  rise  in  prices,  the  DBB  imposed  severe  restrictions  on  the 
banks'  free  reserves.  Given  that  the  banks  were  entirely dependent 
on  these  reserves  for their liquidity this  intermediate goal  enabled 
the  DBB  to control  bank  credit. 
From  1970  onwards  it was  clear that  the  national  and  inter-
national  monetary  markets  had  developed  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
banks  were  relying less  on  their free  reserves  and  had  strengthened 
the  role of inter-bank  relations outside  the  control of the  central 
bank.  Although  the  volume  of reserves  had  been  reduced  to a  level which 
had  previously  been  regarded  as  "critical",  credit continued  to  expand 
at a  rapid  rote.  It was  in  1973-74  however  that  the  DBB  made  the  chan-
ges  necessary to achieve  accurate control of the  supply of bank  credit. 
Faced  with  the  way  in  which  the  banking  system  had  adapted  its behav.bur 
to the  development  of the  monetary  market,in  1973  the  DBB  almost  compl~ 
tely soaked  up  the  banks'  free  reserves  using  the traditional tools at 
its disposal  in  the  most  restrictive way  possible.  In  order  for  the 
monetary authorities to  succeed  they had  to  halt  the  huge  inflow of -61-
capital  from  abroad  which  in.spite of the  OM  revaluation  in Oct.  1969 
and  the  free  float vis a vis  the dollar in  May  1971  had  made  the 
central bank's effort to control  the  growth  of  bank  liquidity ever 
less effective.  To  this end  the  central  bank  imposed  obligatory re-
serves  equivalent to  100%  of the  growth  of non-resident deposits;  on 
the  insistent advice of the  088  the Government  revalued  the  OM  and 
took  a  series of  further  measures  including  the  prohibition  of inte-
rest  payment  on  non-residents'  deposits  and  a  requirement  that  pur-
chases  of German  securities  should  be  subject to  authorization.  Di-
rect  flows  of capital  to German  firms  in  the  form  of financial  credit 
granted  by  the  Luxemburg  subsidiaries of German  banks  were  countered 
by  making  it obligatory to deposit 50%  of the  credit in  a  non-interest-
bearing account  with  the 088. 
Having  blocked  the  inflow of capital  from  abroad  and  elimi-
nated  the  possibility of refinancing  the  banks,  the central  bank  was 
able  to adopt  a  highly restrictive monetary  policy.  At  the  same  time 
it prepared  itself to exert direct control over the creation of central 
bank  money  (C8M)  defined  as  the  sum  of currency and  of the  reserves  co-
vering  the  banks'  domestic  liabilities.  Given  that the discount  "ceil-
ings"  had  already been  nearly  fully used  and  that normal  lombard  loans 
had  been  suspended,  the 088  continued  until the  spring of 1974  to 
supply the  banks'  marginal  requirements  for  C8M  on  a  discretionary 
basis at rates of interest higher  than  discount  rate.  In  order to  an-
ticipate and  counteract  large-scale  fluctuations  in  interest rates, 
the  bank  had  provided  itself,  during  1973,  with  a  number  of tools of 
"fine tuning"  capable  of being  used  in  an  arbitrary and  unforseable 
way.  In  December  1974  as  part of this  policy the 088  pubblicly announced 
its growth  target  for  CBM  which  for  1975  and  the  three  following  years 
was  fixed  at 8%  per annum. 
The  combined  effect of the  severe credit  squeeze  of 1973  and 
the  publication of the  target  for  monetary  expansion  led  to a  substan! 
ial reduction  in  the  rate of inflation.  During  the  period  1975-1978  mo--62-
netary  policy was  moderately expansionary while  the effective  increase 
in  money  supply was  consistently in  excess of the  goals  fixed. 
Between  the early months  of 1974  and  the  spring of 1975  the 
gradual  suspension  of the  measures  taken  by  the  government  in  1972 
and  1973  led  to  a  .renewed  capital  inflows  from  abroad.  These  specula-
tive  flows  were  discouraged  by  the  DBB  by  an  increase  in  minimum  re-
serves,  proportional  to  the  growth  of deposits  by  non-residents.  As  a 
result demand  for  credit  by  major  firms  was  shifted onto  the  Euromarket. 
Every  time  that the obligatory reserves  mechanism  tended  to  hinder  flows 
of Eurocaoital  towards  national  banks  the  excess  supply of capital on 
the  Euromarket  tended  to  push  down  eurointerest rates.  This  reduction 
increased  the differential with  respect  to rates of interest on  the 
national  money  market  which  thus  became  less attractive  for German 
firms  seeking  finance  (Matthes).  The  difference  in  interest rates and 
the  behaviour of the  German  banks  which  in  these  circumstances  encou-
raged  firms  to contract Eurocurrency loans  via  their foreign  subsidia-
ries,  led  to a  shift in  the  flow  of foreign  capital directly towards 
firms.  In  this way  companies  were  allowed  to satisfy their requirements 
for external  finance  without  creating tensions  on  the  national  credit 
market.  De  facto  this led  to  an  expansion  of CBM  in  excess of the  pu-
blished  targets.  Given  that this  expansion  derived  from  increasing de-
mand  for credit needed  to  sustain  an  expansion  of  production it was 
nonetheless  compatible with  stabilization. 
Although  compatible  with anti-inflationary policy the  fact 
that  the  growth  of money  supply consistently exceeded  the  targets 
announced  endangered  the credibility of the  figures  published.  The 
DBB  was  thus  led  to  fix its targets as  a  range  explicitly defining 
the  circumstances  in  which  expansion  would  proceed  at a  lower or  hig~ 
er rate  (DBB,  Monthly  Report,  Jan.  1979).  In  this way  the  flexibility 
of monetary  policy was  placed  on  an  institutional  footing. -63-
The  early months  of 1979  saw  the  beginning of a  new  period  of restric! 
ions.  In  February 1981  these  became  more  severe;  the DBB,  having  sus-
pended  for  the  second  time  "normal"  lombard  loans  to the  banks,  for  a 
number  of days  did  not  even  grant "special"  loans.  As  in  1973  this  led 
to a  sharp increase  in  interest rates.  During  the last months  of 1979 
and  1980  the  situation  was  the opposite of that  between  1972  and  1974; 
now  the  DBB  aimed  to  neutralize,  at least in  part,  the  pressure  on 
bank  liquidity deriving  from  the  massive  withdrawals  by  non-residents 
due  to the  high  level of  international with  respet to German  interest 
rates and  the  uncertainties  on  the external value  of the  OM. 
Since  the  autumn  of 1981  the  DBB  has  used  "fine  tuning"  to 
bring about  an  increase  in  bank  liquidity and  thus  a  gradual  but  per-
sistent decline  in  both  short and  medium-long  term interest rates. 
One  can  thus  identify a  second  distinction  between  German  mo-
netary  policy and  French  and  Italian  policies.  We  have  seen  that in 
order to achieve  its targets  the  DBB  uses  .narket-oriented  policy tools. 
Following  the abolition  (1967)  of control  on  the  interest rates  on  de-
posits and  loans,  with  rare exceptions,  the German  authorities aim 
to  influence  the  relative  profitability of different options  by  the 
credit institutions and  thus  by  savers  and  investors  rather than  sub-
stituting official  for  private decisions.  Thus,  the DBB's  controls 
change  the  environmental  conditions  in  which  decisions  are  taken  rather 
than  acting directly as  would  be  the  case with  ceilings  on  loans.  As 
has  been  observed  by  the  DBB  itself (House  of Commons)  the  justificat-
ion  for this  behaviour lies in  the  fact  that direct action  on  the  assets 
of individual  banks  would  change  the  competitive  positions of the dif-
ferent  banking  groups,  a  view  confirmed  by  Italian and  French  experience. 
On  the  contrary to the  policy adopted  by  the  Bank  of Italy and 
the  Bank  of France,  which  for  a  decade  now  have  been  using administra-
tive controls  not  only to achieve  a  more  timely regulation  over credit 
but also to  influence its composition  (by size of loan  and  by  economic -64-
sector)  the German  central  bank  has  restricted its action  to the de-
termination  of the  macro-economic  conditions  in  which  the  banks  ope-
rate,  leaving  the latter free  to  select credit as  they see fit. 
Further on  we  will  see  the  conditions  under  which  the  severe 
and  non-discriminatory behaviour of the German  monetary authorities 
has  succeeded  in  avoiding  excessively negative  repercussions  on  the 
capital accumulatioh  process. 
The  rationale of monetary  policy 
The  constitutional  significance of the  maintenance of mone-
tary stability gives German  monetary  policy a  key  role  in  general e-
conomic  policy.  During  the  period  examined  here  the  DBB  has  ended  up 
by  shaping  much  of German  economic  policy.  Here  the German  experience 
is clearly very different  from  that of France or Italy even  though  in 
this latter case  central  bank  policy was  also extremely important  in 
influencing  the  formulation  and  the  conduct of economic  policy.  In 
France  monetary  policy has  "accompanied"  government  policy on  economic 
growth.  In  Italy monetary  policy acquired  exceptional  importance during 
the  period  1965-75  when  it took  upon  itself the  "anomalous"  objective 
of creating the  conditions  for  (rather than  merely accompanying)  ca-
pital accumulation.  In  Germany  on  the  other  hand  monetary  policy, 
while  pursuing  the  "orthodox"  target of monetary stability,  has  never 
lost its awareness  of the effects on  capital accumulation  and  indus-
trial growth. 
According  to  the  argument  advanced  earlier the  policy of the 
DBB  is  influenced  by  the  need  to  maintain  the  universal  bank  system. 
The  objective of maintaining  monetary stability is held  to  be  a  par-
ticularly significant consequence  of this  fact.  What  has  been  assumed 
here  is that  theGerman  banking  system is  particularly sensitive  {mo~e 
than  the Italian or French  systems~ to variations  in  the  rate of in-
flation  sufficiently large  to  induce  the  owners  of  financial  wealth -65-
to shift their preferences  from  medium-long  term  to monetary assets. 
It is obvious  that  these variations  should  be  measured  with  respect 
to the  "normal"  rate of inflation  in  any  given  period. 
The  logic  followed  by  the  DBB  in  the  conduct of monetary  P£ 
!icy seems  to confirm this argument  and  the  hypothesis  on  which  it 
is based.  The  two  periods  since  1970  in which  tight monetary  restric! 
ions  were  imposed  (1973  and  1981)  were  both  preceeded  by  a  fall  in 
the  importance of long  term  bank  liabilities  (Graph  IV.1). 
In  both  cases  the  policy adopted  by  the  DBB  led  to drastic 
increases  in  money  market  interest rates.  In  both  cases,  intervention 
by  the  bank  was  extremely  firm  and  lasted  only a  very limited  period 
of time.  No  longer able  to  re-finance  themselves  from  the  central 
bank,  the  banks  increased  the  pressure  on  the  money  market  and  sold 
bonds.  In  this way  the  increase of money  market  rates was  immediately 
transmitted  to  those  on  financial  markets.  Interest on  bank  deposits 
adapted  to these  rates.  The  end  result of this adjustment  was  in  both 
cases  a  change  in  the  composition  of the  banks'  liabilities and  an 
increase  in  the  share of their medium-long  term liabilities (this 
effect  is less visible in  1981).  The  fact  that this result was  ob-
tained  was  obviously due  to the credibility of the signal  from  the 
central bank  showing  its  firmness  in  the  struggle against  inflation. 
In  practice  monetary  policy seems  to  have  been  based  on  changes  in  the 
publick  inflationary expectations  rather than  on  actual  trends  on  pri-
ces  (see Graph  IV.1).  It is the  former  which  determine  the  public's 
options with  respect to the  composition  of its financial  portfolio. 
The  credibility of the DBB's  policy  has  been  strenghtened 
by  the  tough  approach  taken  towards  monetary  restrictions.  Here  we 
discover one  of the  reasons  why  the  DBB  has  always  opposed  any  form 
of indexation.  Indexation  would  end  up  by  neutralising the effects 
induced  by  changes  in  portfolio composition  by  the  owners  of  financial 
wealth  (Matthes  (b),  Andreas).  Although  the  policy lines adopted  by -66-
the central  bank  for  the  control of the  stock of money  imply extre-
mely  volatile interest rates  (as  is also the  case  in  the  USA)  the 
DBB  has  preferred  to concentrate  sharp changes  in  interest rates  in 
a  very short  period  of time after which  fluctuations  are  maintained 
at a  relatively limited  level.  There  are  two  motives  which  justify 
this extremely rigorous  approach  when  it is necessary to  break  infla-
tionary expectations  and  the  pragmatic  line  taken  during  normal  times. 
The  first is the  need  to guarantee  the  effectiveness of the  mechanisms 
used  to control  the  composition  of the  public's  financial assets;  the 
second  is that  frequent  fluctuations  in  rates  would  damage  banks  pri-
marily  committed  to  medium-long  term  loans  bearing  a  fixed  rate of 
interest.  By  adopting  a  line of rare,  yet drastic,  intervention  the 
central  bank  limits  the  negative effects on  bank  profits to a  limited 
number  of short  periods. 
The  monetary  policy  followed  by  the  DBB  has  not  only limited 
the  negative effects of deflationary policy on  the  banks  but  has  also 
exerted  a  positive  influence  on  their growth.  As  far as  foreign  busi-
ness  is concerned,  the  prospect of revaluation  of the  DM,  together 
with  a  generally  "market-oriented"  attitude  (with  occasional cor-
rections)  to capital  movements,  has  made  it possible  for  the  banks  to 
internationalise,  enormously expanding  their  foreign  operations.  The 
market  for  DM  bonds,  largely  fed  by  issues  by  the  banks  and  comple-
tely controlled  by  the  banking  system,  has  reached  significant  pro-
portions.  During  the  1970s  the  foreign  subsidiaries of German  banks, 
particularly in  Luxembourg,  have  rapidly increased  in  number.  Domesti 
cally,  a  large  proportion  of the  growing  volume  of resources  requi-
red  to  finance  the  public debt,  especially since  1979,  has  been  obtain 
ed  using  medium-long  term  bank  loans.  In  this  way  the  financing  of 
the  public  sector  has  been  achieved  without  reducing  the  role of the 
banks,  as  has  occurred  in Italy. 67 
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Competition  and  Financial Stability 
Although  the  growth  of the German  banking  system  has  not 
been  damaged  by  anti-inflationary monetary  policy,  and  although it 
has  met  with little competition  from  the capital  market  or  from  other 
financial  intermediaries,  competition  within  the  system itself has 
sharpened.  Since  the  early 1970s  there  has  been  a  structural change 
in the  system  which  has  pushed  it towards  further  "despecialisation" 
(088,  Monthly  Reports  Apr.  1971,  May  1974,  Aug.  1978).  This  has  oc-
curred  at two  different levels:  on  the  one  hand,  within  the  system 
taken  as  a  whole,  on  the  other within  individual  banking  groups.  Co~ 
pared  with  the  situation  in  the  first half of the  1960s  the  speciali~ 
ed  credit institutions  have  suffered  a  reduction  in  their share  of 
the  market.  This  has  particularly affected  the  "mortgage  banks",  spe-
cialised  in  long-term credit,  and  the  special institutions,  engaged 
in  providing  credit  for  industries in crisis,  backward  regions,  and 
small- and  medium-sized  enterprises.  There  has  also  been  a  slowing 
down  in  the  growth  of the  "private bankers"  who,  depending  particula!. 
ly on  the  money  market,  have  suffered  severely during  periods  of res-
trictive monetary  policy.  An  increased  market  share  on  the  other  hand 
has  been  taken  by  credit cooperatives  {whose  credits,  since  1974,  have 
no  longer  been  restricted  to  cooperative  members)  and  by  the  central 
institutions of the  savings  banks.  There  has  also  been  a  slight in-
crease  in  the  share of the  big  banks  and  the  regional  banks.  It is 
these  three groups  of banks  (the credit cooperative-s,  the  savings 
banks  and  the  commercial  banks)  which  have  shifted  the  composition  of 
their activities  towards  further despecialisation.  As  a  result,  their 
respective  fields  of operation  have  moved  closer together,  so  far  in 
fact  as  to  reverse  the  previous  pattern of market  domination  in  the 
granting of short  term credit,  where  it is no  longer the  big  banks 
but  the  savings  banks  which  hold  the largest share.  Credit  cooperatives 
and  the  savings  banks  have  also  been  increasingly active  in  the  synda-
cated  issuing of shares  by  firms,  although  this activity is still do--69-
minated  by  the  big  banks.  On  the other  hand,  it has  been  mainly  the 
big  banks  which  have  intensified their activities on  the  international 
money  and  capital  markets,  to  a  large extent  through  the activities 
of their  foreign  subsidiaries  (DBB,  Monthly  Report  1978).  The  inter-
nationalisation of the  banking  system,  the  fluctuations  of prices 
and  exchange  rates  on  world  markets,  the  intensification of competit-
ion  among  the  banks  and  the  severity of the  monetary  squeezes  imposed 
by  the  DBB  have  revealed  the  potential  for  financial  instability im-
plicit in  a  relatively unregulated  system.  It is this which  led  to 
the only "structural" credit  policy measures  taken  in  Germany  during 
the  period  under  examination. 
In  1973  and  1974,  when  monetary  restrictions were  extremely 
tight,  Germany  witnessed  the collapse of ten  banks.  The  German  autho-
rities responded  introducing  modifications  to  the  1961  banking  law,  the 
ieast  restrictive of those  in  the  three countries.  The  changes  ap-
proved  in  1976  were  motivated  by  concern  over  the  stability of  finan-
cial institutions.  As  well  as  abolishing  those  credit institutions 
legally classified as  "individual  banking  companies",  the  new  banking 
law  provided  the authorities with  increased  powers  of control allow-
1ng  inspections of credit institutions even  if there is no  special 
reason  for  them  and  no  longer,  as  established  by  the  1961  banking 
law,  only those  inspections  for  which  there are  "well-founded  motives". 
It should  be  observed  that the  new  banking  law  also  provided  for  a  d~ 
posit  guarantee  fund"  which  replaced  the  old  "emergency  fund"  which 
had  covered  only certain  kinds  of deposit  up  to  a  fixed  ceiling. 
The  new  guarantee of deposits is on  a  voluntary basis  and  takes  ac-
count  of the  specific differences  between  the  savings  banks,  the  credit 
cooperatives  and  the  commercial  banks. 
A further  important  change  in  the  banking  law  concerned  the 
reduction  of the  overdraft limits  for  large  loans,  that is,  for indi-
vidual  loans  to  a  value  in  excess of  15%  of the  assets of the  credit -70-
institution.  Not  only was  there  a  reduction  in  the  maximum  volume  of 
credit which  could  be  granted  to an  individual client; at the  same 
time  the  formula  of the  law  was  changed  from  a  recommendation  to an 
explicit  prohibition.  It is of interest to quote  the dissenting opin-
ion,  limited  to this latter modification,  expressed  by  the  "Central 
Credit Committee",  which  includes  the  representatives of the  business 
associations of the  various different  forms  of credit institution.  Ac 
cording  to the Committee,  the  change  in  the  overdraft ceilings  could 
not  only exert  a  significant effect on  the  economy  as  a  whole,  but 
could  also  "push  many  credit institutions towards  medium  scale,  and 
thus  relatively riskier,  operations",  while at the  same  time  "induc-
ing  an  acceleration  in  the  phenomenon  of concentration  with  negative 
effects on  the  structure and  on  the level of competition of the 
system  (Lovato). 
This  reaction  by  the  banks  to the  changes  in the  regulations 
on  overdraft ceilings raises  the  question  of the  relations  between 
the  universal  bank  and  industry and  can  only  be  understood if one  bears 
in  mind  the  scale of  firms  within  the  sectors least damaged  by  the 
restrictive monetary  policy. 
Contrary to what  one  might  expect,  the  use  of market-orient-
ed  policy tools  has  allowed  monetary  policy to achieve  a  degree of 
selectivity during restrictive  periods.  This  fact  constitutes one 
further  justification for  the  088  aversion  to the administrative re-
gulation of credit,  as  applied  in  France  and  Italy.  Market-oriented 
policy tools  have  not  only left relative competitive  positions within 
the  banking  system  unchanged;  at the  same  time  they have  made  it possi 
ble  to  be  selective in  the  granting of credit. 
During  periods of monetary  restrictions this selectivity has 
operated  in  favour  of large  firms.  The  main  channel  through  which  it 
has  operated  has  been  the  behaviour of the  banks  and  especially of 
the  three  big  banks  and  the  central institutions of the  savings  banks 
which  have  a  very close  relationship with  large  companies. -71-
Except  during the  period  of the  compulsory deposit  on 
foreigh  credit~ funds  from  abroad  guaranteed  large German  companies' 
the  external  finance  they  required.  During  the  1970s  this  foreign 
t 
channel  for  finance,  which  on  account  of the  nature of the  operations 
involved  and  of their scale  was  a  monopoly  of large  firms,  provided 
on  average  more  than  20%  of external  financing  of  non  financial  com-
panies.  This  selectivity of monetary  policy  has  been  explicitly con-
firmed  by  Helmut  Schlesinger,  the  former  vice  president of the  Bunde~ 
bank,  who  has  stated that when  the central  bank's  market-oriented 
policy tools ore  employed  to  restrictive ends it is particular sectors 
of the  economy  and  especially small  and  medium-sized  companies  which 
suffer.  According  to Schlesinger,  olthough  the 088  is not  unaware  of 
this discrimination  the  only way  for it to  take  a  more  selective ap-
proach  would  be  to  encroach  on  the area of  policy making  reserved  to 
parliament and  the  government  (Schlesinger).  If one  also  bears  in 
mind  the  reduction  in  the  market  share of the  special credit institut-
ions,  the  majority of whose  role is to  channel credit to  small  and 
medium-sized  firms it becomes  clear how  far the  supply of credit to 
these  companies  has  been  rationed.  The  de  facto  selectivity of  German 
monetary  policy is fully coherent with Germany's  industrial structure, 
specialised  in  those  export  sectors dominated  by  large enterprises. 
One  may  thus  understand  the  concern  expressed  by  the Central Credit 
Committee  as  regards  the  reduction  of the overdraft ceilings  on  large 
credits. These,  the  committee  believed,  could  induce  the credit instit-
utions  to  engase  in  smaller scale operations  involving  small  and  medium-
scale enterprises hit  by  restrictive monetary  policy and  therefore 
implying  a  higher risk element  than  credits to large companies. 
The  way  in  which  small enterprises  have  been  hit is confirmed 
by  the  increase  in  the  number  of insolvencies during  the  1970s.  "Since 
1970  the  number  of insolvencies  has  increased  very  rapidly  •••  from  an 
average  of 500-600  cases  per  year during  the  1960s  to  1861  cases  in -72-
1973  and  1652  in  1977.  It is interesting to  note  that during  the 
1970s  more  than  two  thirds of all insolvencies  were  of  firms  which 
had  been  on  the  market  for at least 8  years"  (Dol  Bosco).  This  lat-
ter observation  shows  one  of the limitations  in German  industrial 
strategy:  the  way  in  which  this strategy inhibits innovation  by  new 
firms. 
The  existence of a  privileged  relationship between  the  banks 
and  large enterprises is closely tied  to the  way  in  which  the  banks 
can  control  the latter.  As  is well  known  the  universal  bank  owns  in-
dustrial shares,  exercises  the  voting rights deriving  from  the  shares 
deposited  with  the  bank  by  its clients  (the  ••·Depgt.stmmrecht•  J  and  has 
its representatives  on  company  boards. 
This  "triple" influence of the  banks  on  industry and  above 
all their right to  own  shares  in  industrial  companies  has  given  rise 
to  heated  debate  and  to various  proposals  for  reform.  The  motive  for 
this  concern  is on  the  one  hand  the acceleration of industrial  con-
centration  with  an  increase  in  mergers  and  a  consequent  reduction  in 
competition,  to  which  German  law  assigns  a  "decisive role  in  regulat-
ing  and  stimulating the  economic  process•,  on  the other the  possibi-
lity that the  credit  system  could  abuse  its  power  to dominate  indus-
try in  the  way  described  by  Hilferding in  "Finance Capital". 
According  to the  "anti-monopoly commission"  set  up  as  a  re-
sult of the  new  "law  against  restrictions on  competition"  passed  in 
1974,  the credit institutions'  holdings  in  firms  in  non-financial 
sectors distort competition  both  among  firms,  - firms  in  which  the 
banks  have  holdings  receive  preferential treatment  - and  among  the 
banks  themselves.  Here  it is the large  banks  with their role  as  major 
holders  and  purchasers  of industrial shares  which  find  themselves  in 
a  privileged  position.  The  commission  thus  recommend  that  banks  should 
not  be  allowed  to  purchase  more  than  a  5%  holdi~in non-banks,  ex-
cept  in  sectors assimilated  to banking  or when  such  holdings  are  ne--73-
cessary in order  for  the  banks  to  f~lfil their  proper  function  (as 
in  the  case of company  recovery  programmes). 
These  recommendations  were  limited  to the  banks'direct  hold-
ings  which  in German  manufacturing  industry as  a  whole  account  for 
only 2,8% of the total capital of companies  (although the  banks  hold-
ings  are at a  higher  level  in  certain  specific sectors  such  es  brew-
ing).  What  the  commission  did  not  consider were  the  shares deposited 
with  the  banks  (50%  of the total amount  of shares  in  1974)  and  for 
·which  the latter exert voting  rights  (Immenga).  Given  that only an 
insignificant  proportion  of share-holders give  instructions  prior to 
meetings it becomes  clear how  the  influence deriving  from  this  "right" 
is even  greater than  that due  to  the direct ownership of shares.  This 
is confirmed  by  the extent to  which  the  Board  Chairmen  in  the  main 
companies  are  representatives of the  three  big  banks. 
The  "Study Commission  on  Basic  questions  concerning  credit" 
(Gessler)  set up  in  1974  by  the Minister  for  Federal Finance  made  even 
blander  proposals  for  reform.  The  commission  expressed  the  view  that 
the  purchase  of holdings,  the  exercise of  proxy  voting  rights and  the 
nomination  of representatives  on  company  boards  did  not  imply that 
the  banks  were  following  a  policy of concentration  outside the  bank-
ing  sector nor  that they  had  succeeded  in  reducing  competition  within 
the  banking  system.  It went  on  to  propose  that  holdings  should  be  li-
mited  to  25%  plus  one  share of a  company's  capital,  excluding  shares 
purchased  in the  public interest  (as  in the  case of company  recovery 
programmes)  or on  a  temporary  basis;  that  permanent  voting  rights 
should  be  abolished  and  replaced  by  a  system  in  which  proxies  have  to 
be  renewed  every 15  months;  that the  banks  should  be  obliged  to  request 
individual  instructions  from  their clients  before all important  com-
pany  meetings  and  finally that  the  names  of the  members  of company 
boards  should  be  made  public  (Gessler). -N-
These  proposals derived  from  an  analysis,  encouraged  by  su-
perficial criticism  from  political circles hostile to  the  universal 
bank,  foundered  in  a  bog  of minor detail without  facing  up  to the  key 
problem  raised  by  the  Federal  Banking  Superisory Office of the  re-
lationship between  the  universal  bank  and  financial stability.  Inso-
far as  concerns  the  peculiar relationship in  Germany  between  banks 
and  companies,  the Gessler Commission  recognized  the  possibility that 
the  former  might  exert a  degree  of influence over the latter. The 
majority of the  Commission  did  not  believe  however  that this actually 
occurs.  One  thus  sees  confirmed  both  the  conpenetration  of  finance 
and  industrial capital and  the desire  not  to  change  the  underlying 
financial  structure.  This  does  not  mean  that  in Germany  today indus-
trial capital is dominated  by  finance  capital.  What  it does  mean  is 
that  any discussion  of the ability of the  German  financial  system  to 
meet  the  requirements  of the  economy  requires  this  point  to  be  cla-
rified  looking  for  the  limits of  a  model  of growth  based  on  a  highly 
concentrated  industrial and  financial  structure. -75-
IV.3  ITALY  :  THE  CONCEPT  OF  "ORDINARY  CREDITu  AND  THE  EVOLUTION  OF 
THE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM 
The  flexibility of banking  legislation and  the  importance  of 
the central bank 
Over  the last twenty  years  the Italian business  cycle  has 
been  marked  by  short,  yet  intense,  periods  of expansion  followed 
by  prolonged  periods of  recession.  On  the  basis of the  usual  indi-
cators it is practically impossible  to  identify any  consistent or 
dominant  trend  for  the whole  period.  Up  until the late 1960s  Italy 
benefitted  from  a  high  degree  of  price stability;  from  1973  onwards 
the  rate of inflation has  been  one  of the  highest  in the  OECD  with 
annual  price rises consistently in the  two  figure  range.  In  a  very 
short  period  of time  the  unusually largesurpluses  on  external cur-
rent account  which  marked  the  years  between  1964  and  1972  had  been 
replaced  by  dramatic deficits  (1973-1976) followed  by  a  spectacular 
recovery  (1977-1979). 
This  unstable,  "neurotic"  performance  makes  it impossible 
to trace the  evolution  of the  financial  system to a  consistent trend 
in  the  economy  itself or in  economic  policy.  It is true  that there 
has  been  much  use  of monetary  policy and  a  diversification of the 
policy-tools available in  this  field,  surrogating  for  the  lack  of an 
effective  fiscal  policy.  It is also true that this  has  affected  the 
Italian  financial  structure.  Nonetheless  there exist basic  features 
of the Italian financial  system  which  are  a  cause  rather than  a  con-
sequence  of monetary  policy.  The  growing  demand  for  finance  from  the 
public  sector,while undoubtedly  influencing the  functioning  of the 
credit  system  seems  equally inadequate  as  a  point of departure 
some  of the  characteristics of the  system are  in  fact  independent 
of this  phenomenon. -76-
A good  point of departure is the  peculiar position  in  which 
Italian legislation  places  the  banks  vis a vis  those in  France  or in 
Germany;  this is obviously a  prior consideration  to  monetary  policy 
or to  the  financial  requirements  of the  public  sector.  As  has  already 
been  noted,  the  peculiarity of the  Italian  banking  system is the 
following:  that the  law,  while  failing to define  "prototypes"  of 
banking activity,  as  in  France,  does  not  leave  this to the initia-
tive of the  bankers,  as  in  Germany.  On  the  one  hand,  this  law  esta-
blishes  the  principle of the  separation of  banking activity  from  that 
of  firms  - absent  in  the  legislation of the other two  countries  -
on  the other it leaves it to  the  monetary authorities to determine 
the structure of the  banks'  assets,  either through active interven! 
ion  or by  tacit consent.  As  a  result,  a  description  of banking acti 
vity as  contemplated  by  Italian legislation  requires  the  concept  of 
the  "ordinary credit  bank"  (see  page  11  ). It is the  monetary  auth~ 
rities which  have  the  responsibility for determining the  forms  which 
this  may  assume  and  thus  what  they deem  to  be  the  optimal  financial 
structure  for  the system;  no  changes  in legislation ore  required.  It 
is this  flexibility that explains  the  longevity of Italian  banking 
law. 
As  a  first step it is thus  necessary to identify the  main 
characteristics of the  financial  structure which  the  monetary  autho-
rities,  and  particularly the  Bank  of Italy,  have  forced  or allowed 
the  system  to  adopt.  It will then  be  necessary to  ask  how  far these 
characteristics  have  proved  themselves  adequate  to the  requirements 
of ~economic growth. 
It was  only at the  end  of the  1970s  that  the statistics be-
gan  to  show  signs of a  reduction  in the  intermediation activity of 
the  banks  and  thus  of a  change  in  the  structure of the Italian credit 
system.  Nonetheless  the  change  in attitude of the  monetary authorities 
began  several  years earlier,  between  1975  and  1976,  the  period  in -77-
which  P.  Baffi  took  G.  Carli's  place at the  end  of the latter's 
fifteen  years  as  governor of the  Bank  of Italy.  On  the other hand, 
as  early as  the  1963  credit  squeeze,  the Bank  of Italy began  to de-
velop rather a  clear view  of what  it saw  as  the desirable  structure 
of the Italian credit  system,  of the  roles of the various  interme-
diaries and  markets  and  of the duties of the central bank.  It thus 
seems  legitimate,  in the  reconstruction. of the  development  of the 
Italian  financial  system  from  the  mid  1960s  to the  present day  to 
define  two  distinct  financial  structures:  the  structure which  cha-
racterized  the  period  1965-1975  and  that of the  period  up  to the  pr! 
sent day. 
The  period  1965-1975 
In  order to  understand  the characteristics of the  financial 
system which  emerged  during  this  period it is necessary to recall 
th~ two  alternatives which  were  opened  to the  monetary authorities. 
They  could  limit the  banks'  importance  in  the  field  of  pure  commer-
cial credit thus  adopting  the  "strong"  version  of the  principle of 
credit specialization;  ~lternatively they  could  allow  the  bankers 
to extend,  directly or indirectly,  their activities into  the  field 
of medium-long  term  credit.  In  1958  the  Bank  of Italy had  opted  for 
the  first of these alternatives.  Given  the  novelty represented  by  the 
Balance of Payment  surplus  on  current account  the central  bank  em-
barked on  a  decidedly expansionary  policy avoiding  the sterilization 
of the additional monetary  base  created  and  lowering the discount 
rote.  Given  that the  level of economic  activity was  depressed  these 
measures  supplied  the system with additional liquidity which,  ac-
cording to the  central  bank's  intentions,  should  have  favoured  the 
development  of the  capital market  (Marconi).  In  the  period  between 
the  end  of 1957  and  the  end  of 1959 there was  in  fact  an  exceptional 
expansion  in  net issues  on  the  securities markets  both  by  the  special 
credit institutions and  by  public  and  private corporations. -78-
The  monetary authorities'  attempt  to create a  financial 
structure  based  on  a  low  level of banking  intermediation  failed.  The 
extraordinary economic  expansion  during  the  period  1959-1962  was 
financed  to a  large extent  by  the  banks  which  expanded  therr lend-
ing also  providing  "false short  term"  loans  to medium  and  small-
sized  firms  ill-served  by  the special credit institutions.  One  of the 
reasons  for which  the capital  market  did  not  compete  effectively with 
the  banks  was  that  major  private enterprises  failed  to  profit  from 
the  favorable  situation on  the  stock  market  to develop it further 
(Filippi). 
During  the  period  immediately  following  the  crisis of 1963 
the monetary authorities gradually defined  a  different conception  of 
what  constituted the desirable  financial  structure.  This  time  they no 
longer attempted  to develop the  capital market  in  contrast with  bank 
intermediation;  rather they attempbd  to  reconcile  the  two.  In  1965 
the Bank  of Italy launched  a  policy aimed  at strengthening the  market 
for  bonds.  While  the  banks  were  granted  authorization to cover a  pro-
portion  of their obligatory reserves  with  long  term  bonds  the central 
bank  intervened  to stabilize  prices  on  the  market. 
Although  the  adoption  of a  monetary  policy aimed  at stabiliz-
ing  the  rate of return  on  bonds  stimulated  the interest of the  public, 
at the  same  time it provided  the  banks  with  an  investment  opportunity 
which  was  almost  devoid  of risk.  This  was  a  powerful  incentive to in-
crease  interest rates  on  deposits,  thereby attracting new  funds.  It. 
was  this line of conduct  in  fact  which  allowed  the  banks  to limit the 
effects of the  competition  due  to the  massive  issueing of bonds  and 
which  led  them  to increase  the  share  of bonds  in their port folios. 
This  behaviour was  authorized  by  the Bank  of Italy. 
It was  this approach  adopted  during  a  period  when  the lines 
of development  of the Italian economy  and  of  public  intervention were 
under  reconsideration at  a  political level,  that determined  the  form -79-
taken  by  the  credit system  and  the objectives of the central  bank 
during  the  period  1965-1975.  It~ not  intended  in  the  present work 
to  pass  judgement  on  the  motives  underlying this  policy.  It is worth 
noting  however  that the alternative of keeping  bank  intermediation 
low  would  have  required  the  "spontaneous"  development  of a  whole  se-
ries of  financial  intermediaries acting as  projection onto  the  market 
of companies'  financial  requirements.  At  the  same  time  this alterna-
tive line of policy would  have  required  a  rationalization and  improved 
organization of the  financing  of the  public  administration.  It is true 
that even  in the  absence  of these conditions the Bank  of Italy could 
still have  "forced"  the  system  to adopt  this solution.  It is also 
true,  however,  that  such  a  policy would  not  only  have  been  of doubt-
ful  efficacy but  would  also  have  proved  less than  beneficial to good 
relations  between  the  central  bank  and  the  banks. 
These  two  conditions,  namely  the  "autonomous"  organization 
of  both  the  public  and  private sectors,  were  not  to  be  fulfilled  until 
at least after 1975.  Even  the elite of the  private enterprise  system 
failed  to  produce  financial  institutions capable of competing  with 
the  banks  or with the  special  credit institutions. At  the  same  time 
the  public administration  not  only did  not develop a  financialcircuit 
of its own  but  consented  to the decline of those institutions,  modelled 
on  French  lines,  of which  it actually disposed. 
The  solution  adopted  was  thus  the  second  alternative.  This 
occurred  without  any  change  in  banking  law,  using  the  freedom  granted 
to the  bankers  and  the  monetary  authorities to determine  what  is to 
be  meant  by  "ordinary credit".  The  evolution of the Italian  financial 
system  can  therefore  be  identified to  a  large extent with  that of the 
concept  of "ordinary credit". -80-
Bank  intermediation  and  "ordinary credit" 
In  the  structure which  the Italian  financial  system  gradual-
ly assumed  between  1965  and  1975  the  banks  succeeded  in  attracting 
a  growing  proportion  of  households'  financial assets.  During  this 
period  the  banks'  share of  family  financial  savings doubled  and  by 
1975  has  almost  reached  75%.  A .further reason  for  the  increased 
raising of  funds  was  that the  shareof  household  financial  balances 
on  national  income  increased  over this  period  by  a  good  50%.  To  an 
ever greater extent  the  bridging of the  growing  gap  between  savers 
and  investors was  entrusted  to the  bank.  As  a  result,  despite  a  sharp 
drop  from  1979 onwards,  the  period  from  1965  to  1980  witnessed  a 
high  average  increase of  bank  deposits.  Obviously this reflected  the 
composition  and  volume  of households'  financial  assets.  This  does 
not  mean  however  that the  banks  simply reacted  passively to a  shift 
in  households  preferences.  On  the  contrary the  banks  were  extremely 
active  in  influencing  household  behaviour.  The  collection of  funds 
has  been  the  main  area  of competition  within  the  banking  system,  a 
form  of competition  centred  primarily around  the interest rates  on 
deposits.  The  monetary authorities,  although  they  had  the  power  to 
regulate interest rates  on  deposits,  entrusted  these to the self-
regulation  of the  banking  system,  recognizing  the  agreements  "car-
tels")  among  the  banks  (for further  information  see Biscaini  Cotu-
la).  Throughout  the  period  there  were  difficulties in  the applicat-
ion  of this  self-regulation,  frequently referred  to  in  the Governor's 
Annual  Reports. 
The  banks  thus  acted  as  a  permanent  factor distorting  house-
hold's  preferences towards  bank  dep::>sits,  regardless of lending op-
portunities  (Cingano).  In  this way  they not  only competed  with  the 
capital market,  but  also  encouraged  the  public's  preference  for  highly 
liquid  forms  of asset.  This latter phenomenon,  which  represent  a  pe-
culiar feature  of the Italian  system,  should  be  viewed  in  the light -81-
of the differences  between  the Italian  banks  and  those  of the  other 
two  countries.  At  least until recent times  the  limited  volume  of 
what  are  viewed  formally  as  medium-long  term  lending  has  failed  to 
provide  a  sufficient incentive  for  the consolidation of bank's lia 
bilities. 
Compared  to  the  volume  of  funds  raised  by  the  special credit 
institutions the  performance  of  the  banks  differs significantly bet-
ween  the  periods  1963-1972  and  1972-1980  (Table II.7).  During  the 
former  period  the  volume  of funds  collected  by  the  special institu-
tions  grew  faster  than  that of the  banks.  This  was  due  to the  issuing 
of a  massive  volume  of  bonds,  whose  sale was  encouraged  by  the  Bank 
of Italy'  policy of stabilizing their return.  The  banks  resisted 
the competition  from  bonds  by  increasing the  volume  of deposits  to 
a  greater extent  than  the  volume  of lending,  investing the  excess 
funds  in  the  bonds  issued  by  the special credit institutions.  From 
the  mid  1960s  onwards  there  thus  developed  a  "double intermediation" 
circuit which  reconciled  the  banks'  propensity to attract deposits 
with  the  need  to  increase  the  flow  of  medium-long  term  finance. 
In  order to  identify the  concept  of "ordinary credit" which 
defines thefinancial structure during  the  decade  from  1965-1975, 
it is useful  to  see  the outlets  found  by  the  banks  for  the  massive 
volume  of resources  they  now  administered.  Bonds  provided  a  highly 
important  contribution to  banks'  assets.  The  share of bonds  in  the 
banks'  portfolios  increased  continually throughout  the decade.  Above 
all however  it was  in  the  period  1964-1968  that  the  banks  became  ac-
customed  to  investing their assets  in  fixed-income  securities and 
that double  intermediation  became  a  structural  feature  of the Italian 
financial  system.  The  introduction  of the  porfolio  c01 straint in 
1·973  institutionalized the tendency  by  the  banks  to  increase the  vo-
lume  of their depsits  regardless of the  existence  of lending op-
portunities  relying  on  the  spread  between  the return  on  bonds  and  the -82-
rates  on  deposits.  The  distribution of  bank  credit  by  sector shows 
both  the  range  of the credit  requirements  satisfied  by  the  banks  and 
the  instability of their relations with  the different  categories of 
clients.  The  Italian  banks  have  distributed  funds  to  an  extremely 
heterogeneous  clientele  (not  only various different-sized  private 
companies,  but  also state  participation companies,  public  corporat-
ions,  local authorities,  social insurance  agencies,  hospitals,  etc.). 
At  the  same  time  however,  lending  has  shown  patterns of instability 
which  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  normal  cyclical  behaviour.  As 
has  been  pointed  out  by  Onado,  there  is a  similar lack of stability 
in  the  relationship between  particular categories of clientele and 
specific kinds  of  bank  (a  specific  size of  bank  or  banks  with  a  spe-
cific  form  of legal status).  Much  of this instability- how  much 
cannot  be  quantified  - is due  to the  fact  that  bank  credit  has  been 
used  not  only to  supply working  capital  but  also,  in  practice,  to 
differing extents at different times,  as  medium  to  long  term credit 
or as  surrogate  risk capital  for  public  enterprise.  At  the  same  time 
banks  lending  has  substituted  the  revenue  from  the tariffs on  pu-
blic services as  well  as  the  funds  which  the  chaotic  public  finance 
circuit fails  to distribute.  One  may  thus  observe  that,  despite  the 
institutional limits  on  their lending,  the  Italian  banks  in  practice 
have  satisfied a  range  of  financial  requirements  comparable  to  that 
met  by  the  bonks  in  the other two  countries.  In  these countries  the 
banks'  choice of clientele can  be  interpreted as  a  result of action 
by  the legislator  (France)  or of a  development  strategy by  the  banks. 
In  Italy,  on  the other  hand,  given  the  lack of a  clear legislative 
definition of their role,  the  bonks  seem  to  have  continuously shift-
ed  their priorities in  line with  changing  opportunities. 
To  test the  hypothesis  that  the variable  composition  of lend-
ing  and  assets depends  on  the  lack of an  adequate  development  stra-
tegy,  it would  be  necessary to  examine  individual  cases.  Nonetheless, -83-
considering that there existed  a  high  degree  of variability even  be-
fore  the  introduction  (1973)  of administrative  constraints  as  a  per-
manent  tool of monetary  policy,  it does  not  seem  unreasonable  to  sup-
pose  that this was  a  sign  of a  lack of encouragement  for  the  banks 
to clearly define their policy.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  IV.2,  IV.3, 
the  period  1963-1968  witnessed  a  shift of the  banks'  assets  towards 
bonds  and  the  financing  of the  public administration.  It is true 
that during  this  period  there  was  a  change  in  the  composition  of 
aggregate demand  in  which  exports  and  public  expenditure  substituted 
investment  by  private companies  and  by  the  state participation  sector. 
The  only way  however  ~n which  it is  possible  to  explain  the  new  struc-
ture of  bank  lending  in  terms  of this "real" aspect of the  economic 
system  would  be  to  suppose  the  demand  for credit given  with  respect 
to  supply.  During  this  period  this  may  have  been  true  for  the  state 
participation  sector  (which  had  just completed  major  blocks  of  inves! 
ment)  and  for  major  private enterprises  (which  had  increased  its pro-
ductive  capacity during  the  boom  of 1959-1963).  At  the  same  time  how-
ever the  boom  had  been  due  to  a  large extent to the  investment deriv-
ing  from  the  creation and  expansion  of small-scale  firms,  precisely 
the  component  in  accumulation  which  disappeared  in  the  period  1963-
1968.  This  is the  kind  of demand  for  credit which  cannot  be  consider-
ed  as  being  independent  of the  behaviour of the  banks.  It is  probable 
that the  investment opportunities  supplied  to  banks  by  bonds  led  to 
a  rationing of credit to  these  firms  and  in  particular to  a  lack of 
help  for  new  clients.  The  rationing of credit to  the less attractive 
categories of clientele is  however  only one  of the  possible effects 
of the shift of  the  financial  system  towards  a  structure characterized 
by  a  growing  role  for  the  banks  and  a  reduction  in their entrepreneur-
ial drive.  Here  one  immediately notes  the differences with  the  situat-
ion  in  France,  where  the  expansion  of the  "banques inscrites" led  to 
them  assuming  increased  responsibilities  in  investment  financing. -84-
Table  IV.2  Italy:  banks'  lending  and  bonds  holding 
1963-68  1968-72  1972-74  1974-76  1976-80 
1 •  Total  lending  (A %) 
2.  S.C.!.  bonds  (A%) 
3.  2/1 
61,6 
133,6 
2,2 
76,4 
101,3 
1,32 
43 I 1 
195 I 1 
4,5 
S.C.I.  = Special  Credit  Institutions.  Stock data. 
Source:  Banco  d'Italia,  Bollettino 
Table  IV.3  Italy:  banks'  lending elasticity1 
39,7 
25,1 
0,63 
72,7 
80,1 
1 '1 
1963-68  1968-72  1972-74  1974-76  1976-80 
Lending  to: 
Companies 
•  Large  private 
•  Public2 
.  Other 
Public Admin. 
0,64 
0,69 
0, 95 
0,88 
1, 99 
0, 93 
0,63 
1,49 
1  I 3 
0,51 
1  181 
1  , 3 
0,63 
0,48 
1 ,83 
•  Local  Authorities  1 ,84 
•  Soc.  Sec.  Inst.  n.a. 
•  Hospitals  n.a. 
1,67 
4,5 
n.a. 
0,63 
0,84 
4,4 
1  , 1 
0,7 
0,29 
-0,71 
0,7 
-0,62 
1  Ratio  between  the  share  in  banks'  lending during  the  period  and 
that of the  starting year  (stock data). 
2  From  1972  only state  participation  companies. 
Source:  Banco  d'Italia,  Bollettino. 
In  the  French  case  the  banks  were  able to expand  their role 
in  intermediation  via their committment  to  satisfying  firms'  require-
ments  for  finance  and  by  lengthening the  maturities of their liabili-
ties.  In  Italy,  on  the other hand,  the  banks  achieved  the  same  end -~-
by  purchasing  bonds  and  by  trusting in  the  guaranteed  solvency of the 
public  sector  (on  the  role of the  state as direct or indirect gua-
rantor,  see Carli,  Monti,  Padoa  Schioppa). 
During  the  period  1964-1968 the Italian  financial  system  thus 
assumed  a  form  in  which  the  high  level of  bank  intermediation  depend-
ed  on  two  basic  factors:  on  the  one  hand  the  banks'  freedom  to  fix 
the  rates of interest  paid  on  deposits,  on  the  other the outlets  for 
their assets  provided  by  the  opportunity to  purchase  bonds  bearing  a 
very  low  risk and  the  methods  used  by  the  public  sector to satisfy 
its requirements  for  fiancee.  The  high  level of  bank  intermediation 
did  not  correspond  to  a  similar level of responsibility in  the  main-
tenance of relations with the  borrowers.  The  system  lacked  mechanisms 
capable  of stabilizing the  structure of  banks'  assets.  As  a  result 
it was  possible  for  the  banks  to  interrupt  the  flow  of credit when 
other  forms  of  investment  proved  more  advantageous,  thereby altering 
the allocation of assets  between  bonds  and  lending  and  the distribut 
1on  of the  latter to different  categories of clientele.  In  the  former 
case  the  banks,  by  purchasing  bonds  issued  by  the  special credit ins-
titutions did  actually  finance  capital  formation  by  firms.  At  the  same 
time  however,  given  that they  had  no  direct relationship with  these 
the  flow  of  funds  could  be  interrupted at any  time,  without  this ex-
plicitly affecting relations  with the clientele.  In the latter the 
possibility of investing  in  institutions whose  solvency was  almost 
guaranteed  and  whose  attitude to conditions  was  relatively undemand-
ing deflected  funds  away  from  less attractive and  more  demanding 
clients.  In  the absence  of mechanisms  capable  of stabilizing the  banks' 
asset  structure it became  necessary  for  the central  bank  to  intervene 
so  as  to avoid  unwanted  interruptions and  distortions. 
The  financial  structure,  which  emerged  during  the  "quiet  pe-
riod"  of the  mid  1960s,  continued  to  survive  in  the  presence  of the 
disturbances  which  characterized  the  system  from  1969  onwards.  After -86-
on  attempt  to return  to  the  policy of stabilizing the  rate of re-
turn  on  bonds,  which  hod  been  suspended  at the  beginning of 1969, 
1973  sow  the  introduction of the  constraints  on  bonks'  portolios. 
During  the  some  year ceilings were  imposed  on  the  expansion  of cre-
dit.  These  were  defined  in  such  a  way  as  to  toke account  of the  im-
portance of the  role assumed  by  the  bonks  in  financing  certain  sec-
tors of the  public administration.  As  a  result  the  ceilings did  not 
apply to the  railways,  the  hospitals,  the Electricity board  etc. 
These  measures  limited  the  bonks'  freedom  to define  the  com-
position of their assets.  Now  it was  the  central  bonk  which  determ-
ined  what  composition  best  responded  to  any given  situation.  While 
the  "deresponsibilizotion" of the  bonks  assumed  on  institutional 
character the central  bank  become  increasingly involved  in  the  re-
gulation of  flows  of credit.  At  the  some  time  however  there  was  no 
challenge  to the central role  played  by  the  bonks.  Rother the  con-
trary these  were  able  to  expand  their intermediation  activity as 
a  result of the  public's  falling  propensity to  hold  securities,  of 
the initial impact  of inflation on  company  accounts  and  of the  ir-
rational  management  of the  financial  requirements  of the  public  sector. 
Investment  financing:  the  "financial  rood"  to growth 
The  attitude to capitol accumulation  of the credit  system 
and  of economic  policy decision-makers  during  the  period  which  last-
ed  until the  mid  1970s  has  been  called  the  "financial rood"  to  growth 
(Monti,  Cesorini,  Scognomiglio).  What  is meant  is the  use  of moneta-
ry and  credit  policy to  force  the  rote of accumulation  with  more  re-
gard  for  the aggregate  volume  of investment  than  for the efficiency 
of its allocation.  This  expression  implies  a  substantially negative 
evaluation  of  post  experiences  which  is widely  shared  in  Italy 
This  negative evaluation is largely based  upon  the distort-
ions  created  by  the  system of subsidized  credit.  There  con  be  no -87-
doubt  that this  system  of subsidies  and  incentives,  in  a  political-
institutional  framework  characterized  by  the  "appropriation"  of the 
state and  its snstitutions  by  the  political parties,  did  effective-
ly distort the  accumulation  process,  benefitting  firms  which  should 
not  have  invested  or which  would  have  invested  even  without  subsidies. 
Even  disregarding  however  the distortions  introduced  by  economic  po-
licy there are  other elements  in  the  financial  structure which  seem 
to  justify a  substantially negative  judgement.  One  may  note  the  con-
tradiction  between  the  importance  attributed  by  the central  bank  to 
a  high  level of accumulation  and  a  certain  reduction  in  the  entre-
preneurial  role of the  banker,  brought  about  by  economic  policy.  As 
far as  the  banks  are  concerned  it has  already  been  seen  how  the 
structure of the  credit  system  conceived  by  the  Bank  of Italy follow-
ing  the  1963  crisis contained  few  incentives  for  an  efficient allo-
cation of credit.  Undoubtedly  the  opportunities  provided  by  the  pur-
chase of bonds  and  by  the  financing  of the  public  sector have  had 
anything other than  a  stimulatory effect on  the  banks'  responsive-
ness  to  firms'  requirements.  At  the  same  time  the  banks,  in  their re-
lations with  firms,  have  suffered  from  the  lack of a  clear definit-
ion  of their function  (being  neither  pure  commercial  banks  nor  mixed 
banks).  In  the  majority of cases this  has  led  them  to withdraw  from 
one  of the  key  roles of "finance"  vis a vis  "industry":  that of 
"guaranteeing  a  balanced  technical,financial and  market  basis  for 
firms'  expansion  (Confalonieri  (a),  (b)).  As  far as  the  special 
industrial credit institutions are  concerned  here  too  one  notes  a 
process  of dequalification.  As  those  responsible  for the administra! 
ion  of  public  intervention these  institutions  have  seen  their role 
reduced  to that of verifying whether the  firms  applying  for credit 
possess  the  prerequisites established  by  law.  In  the collection of 
f11nds  any  incentive  to  assume  a  more  entrepreneurial attitude has  been 
largely removed  by  the  banks'  purchases  of their bonds. -88-
In  these  conditions  there  have  been  \e ry  few  stimuli to  tech-
nical  innovation  in  the credit  field.  To  a  large  extent  innovation  by 
individual  banks  hove  been  replaced  by  financial  engineering on  the 
port  of the  monetary authorities.  At  the some  time  there  has  been 
very little pressure to  improve  operative efficiency. 
It seems  legitimate to  argue  that  a  financial  system  of this 
type is likely to  favour  rather  than  to  oppose  the  public's  prefere~ 
ce  for liquid assets. Whereas  in Germany  and  France it has  been  in 
the  interest of the  bonks  to  match  the maturities  of their liabili-
ties to  those  of their assets,  in Italy this  has  been  less  so.  This 
explains  why  Italy is the  only country among  those  considered  in 
which  there  has  been  on  increase  in the  shore  of sight deposits  in 
bonks'  liabilities. 
A system as  liquid  as  this is exposed  both  to  financial  and 
to cyclical instability.  The  former  risk  has  been  minimized  by  the 
state's role  as  ultimate guamntor resort.  The  latter, deriving  from 
the  system's  sensitivity to external  shocks  and  to the  corrective 
monetary  policy measures  which  these  make  necessary,  hove  led  to  a 
discontinuity in  the  flow  of credit  mainly  hitting those  firms  rely-
ing  for  credit on  the  renewal  of overdrafts. 
These  features  of the  Italian  financial  system during the 
period  1965-1975  meant  that the  system  was  ineffective  to  satisfy 
the demand  for credit  by  "normal"  unsubsidized  medium-sized  firms. 
Such  firms  could  turn  to  two  kinds  of intermediary,both of whom  ho~ 
ever were  ill-suited to their requirements.  On  the  one  hand  there 
was  the  "omnibus"  bank  (Cingono)  which  tended  to ovoid  forms  of in-
volvement  with  firms  which  loy outside what  is considered  its field 
of activity.  On  the other there  were  the special  institutions whose 
structure was  such  as  to  impede  access. -89-
The  weak  points  we  have  seen  in the  Italian  banking  system 
are  not  to  be  attributed to  weak  management.  For  countries  as  simi-
lar as  those  considered  here  comparisons  of entrepreneurial ability 
are  somewhat  meaningless.  Financial institutions,  however,  to a  far 
greater extent  than  firms  are  influenced  by  the  environment  in  which 
they operate.  The  argument  developed  in  this  paper is that the  con-
ditions  in  which  Italian credit institutions have  operated  have  fail-
ed  to stimulate the  development  of an  effective  system of industrial 
credit. 
Lastly a  note  concerning the central  bank.  The  financial 
structure built  up  by  the  Bank  of Italy during  the  period  of the "fi 
nancial  road  to  growth"  attributed  an  important,  broad-ranging  role 
to the  bank  itself in  the  management  of credit  flows.  In  the  exer-
cise of this responsibility the  bank  was  constrained  however  by  the 
position  in  which  it found  itself. The  Bank  of Italy was  neither  the 
executor of government  economic  policy,  as  in  France,  nor a  counter-
vailing  power  as  in  Germany.  Rather it was  a  key  participant  in  the 
process  whereby  the  government  formulated  Italian  growth  policy 
(Carli). 
Towards  a  new  financial  system 
Until  the  emergence  of  "new  developments"  during  the  second 
half of the  1970s,  Italy's financial  structure  implied  that  policy 
"tools"  were  more  important  than  market  credit  "mechanisms"  (Ciocca). 
This  was  due  to  more  than  just the  range  of  public  intervention  in 
subsidizing  investment  credit and  the  way  in  which  this credit was 
managed  by  the  special institutions.  Quite apart  from  these  aspects 
of the  system  and  from  the necessity for  intervention created  by  in-
flation it can  be  argued  that  the  structure assumed  by  the  credit 
system  could  not  have  survived  without  continual  intervention  by  the 
monetary authorities.  In  this way  the  Bank  of Italy ended  up  by  as--90-
suming  responsibility  for decisions  concerning  the allocation of 
credit. Around  1975  however  there  was  a  change  in  the  Bank  of Italy's 
attitude to  economic  policy and  to the  role of the Central  Bank. 
There  was  a  clear shift in  the  conduct  of monetary  policy towards 
the  pursuit  of the  "normal"  objectives of this  policy and  in  parti-
cular the  balancing of the  country's  foreign  accounts.  At  least 1n 
part  as  a  result of this  change  a  number  of measures  were  taken  as 
a  response  to the  public  sector's growing  financial  problems  and  s~ 
vera!  new  developments  emerg~d. These  initiated a  gradual  transfor-
mation  of the  financial  system  whose  new  characteristics are  today 
beginning  to appear. 
In  March  1975  the Ministerial Committee  for Credit  and  Sav-
ings  approved  a  number  of changes  in  the  method  of issuing Treasury 
bills including authorization  for  non-bank  dealers  to  participate 
in  the auctions.  This  was  a  first  important  step towards  the  creat-
ion  of non-banking  channels  for  the  financing  of the  public  sector. 
The  figures  showing  the  gradual  increase in  the share  of these  assets 
in  the  public's  portfolio  prove  that this  measure  has  made  a  decisi-
ve  contribution  to  reducing  the  role  of banks  intermediation.  At  the 
same  time  however  the  scale of the  treasury's  financing  requirements 
is still such  as  to  make  the  involvement  of the  banks  inevitable. 
A second  series of measures  aimed  at rationalizing  financial 
circuits within  the  public  sector.  These  included  both  the  measures 
taken  at the  end  of 1976  and  the  beginning  of 1977  blocking  and  con-
solidating local authorities'  indebtedness  with  the  banks  and  the 
more  recent decisions,  obliging  public institutions to deposit  their 
liquid  balances  with  the Treasury.  The  blocking  and  consolidation of 
the  local authorities'  indebtedness  closed  one  of the outlets  through 
which  the  banks'  could  expand  their assets.  The  concentration of 
public institutions assets  in  the  hands  of the Treasury reduced  bank 
intermediation  on  the deposits  side.  It was  thus  possible  to  block  a -91-
distorted  financial circuit in  which  "the Treasury emits  bills and 
forces  the central bank  to create  money  to  provide  funds  to  be  trans 
ferred  to other  public  institutions while  the latter  find  it advanta 
geous  to deposit  these with the  banks,  which  in  their turn  invest  in 
Treasury bills"  (Cavazzuti). 
A third  series of measures  concerned  the  medium  to  long-
term credit sector.  Here  the  monetary authorities adopted  two  spe-
cific lines of action:  on  the  one  hand  decentralization towards  the 
banks,  on  the other the  break  of the tie between  credit and  subsi-
dies  which  characterized  the  Special  Institutions  (Relazione del  G~ 
vernatore,  Banca  d'Italia 1981).  The  first line of action  implied  a 
number  of decision:  the authorization  (1976)  for  banks  existing in 
the  form  of  public  companies  and  for  cooperatives  to grant  15%  of 
their liabilities in  the  form  of medium-term  loans  (this  reinforced 
a  similar authorization  granted  in  1972);  the  loosening  of the  port-
folio constraint  from  1978  onwards  and  the  exclusion  from  this  cons-
traint of the  bonds  issued  by  industrial credit institutions.  These 
measures  were  more  than  just a  response  to  the  need  to  consolidate 
credits already granted;  rather they constituted  a  stimulus  to  re-
place  the  banks'  indirect links with  firms  via  the  special credit 
institutions with  a  direct  relationship.  As  a  result  the  role of the 
banks  in  the  medium-term  sector has  expanded  considerably  (Cesarini  (a)). 
The  second  line of action is that  implied  by  the  proposals  to 
reorganize  the  system of credit  subsidies  and  incentives.  These  pro-
posals  imply that  in  the  medium-long  term  credit sector the  banks 
should  coexist with  the  special institutions.  The  former  would  be  al-
lowed  to  finance  investment  projects  on  a  limited  scale vis a vis  the 
turnover of the  firm  applying  for credit.  The  latter would  finance 
larger projects.  The  banks  would  thus  be  given  a  more  clearly defined 
and  more  responsible  role  in  the  supply of credit to industry,  there-
by  compensating  the  reduction  in  the  range  of  possibilities open  for -92-
their lending  to  public  institutions.  The  special credit institut-
ions,  for  their part,  would  lose their role as  administrators  of 
public  intervention. 
The  effectiveness of  these  measures  in  modifying  Italy's 
financial  structure  has  been  amplified  by  a  number  of new  develop-
ments  within  the  productive  system.  The  particularly sharp "stagfla.!, 
ion"  experienced  during  the  1970s  has  led  to  changes  both  in  indus-
trial structure and  in  the  composition  of the entrepreneurial class. 
These  in  their turn  have  produced·  significant quantitative  and  qua-
litative effects  on  relations  between  banks  and  firms.  The  violent 
fluctuations  in  raw  materials  and  energy  prices,  the rigidity of the 
labour market,  restrictive economic  policies  and  the  consequent  rise 
in interest rates initially had  the effect of  unbalancing  major  en-
terprises'  financial  accounts,  particularly,  os  in  other countries, 
in  those  sectors worst  hit  by  the  crisis. This  led  to  an  expansion 
of indebtedness  with  the  banks  which  reached  its high  point  in  1974. 
This  was  followed  by  a  gradual  return  to  financial  equilibrium achiev 
ed  via  a  recovery in  profits and,  at least  up  to  1979,  by  a  drastic 
cut in  investment.  At  the  same  time  liquidity was  managed  more  ratio-
nally.  In  this way  companies  were  able to  reduce  their requirement 
for credit  per unit of turnover while  public enterprise benefitted 
from  a  major  increase  in  capital contributions  by  the state. 
Meanwhile  inflation  and  technical  innovation,  together with 
the  characteristics of the  labour market  have  led  to the  development 
of a  sector of  medium  to  small  scale entrepreneurs,  responsible  in 
fact  for  the  majority of industrial  investment.  As  in  the  years  from 
1955  to  1963  industrial development  has  been 
11from  the  bottom  up", 
has  been  largely extensive  in  nature  and  has  been  concentrated  in 
certain specific  regions.  The  consequent  renewal  of the  entrepreneur-
ial class,  encouraged  by  the crisis of a  number  of major  companies -93-
and  groups  which  has  made  it possible  for  new  entrepreneurs  to  join 
the  private industrial elite,  has  encouraged  a  change  in  attitude 
towards  the  banks,  a  mere  demanding  approach  and  a  willingness  to 
develop  non-banking  channels  of  finance. 
The  second  half of the  1970s  thus  witnessed  a  whole  series 
of "novelties" affecting the structure of the  financial  system  and 
reducing  the  importance  of the  two  main  factors  underlying  the  pre-
vious  structure,  namely  the  weakness  if not  the  absence  of  indepen~ 
ent  financial  circuits  for  the  public sector and  for  private  firms. 
These  changes,  although  due  to a  large  extent  to  short  term 
economic  difficulties were  in  fact  structural  in  nature.  Already 
they  have  led  to  changes  in  the Italian  financial  and  credit system, 
encouraging  a  higher degree  of rationality and  a  more  adequate  res-
ponse  to the  financial  requirements  of capital accumulation.  Although 
this  seems  something  of a  paradox  the shift of the  Bank  of Italy's 
goals  from  the  promotion  of capital accumulation  to domestic  and  ex-
ternal stability have  ended  up  by  encouraging  the credit system's 
responsiveness  to  firms'  financial  needs. 
The  recent  changes  in  the  attitudes of  financial  intermedia-
ries  and  their despecialization  have  prepared  the  ground  for  a  glo-
bal  redefinition  of the  fields  of operation  reserved  for  the  banks 
and  the  special institutions.  Many  of the  preconditions  now  exist 
for  a  reform  of the Italian  financial  and  credit  system  which  could 
bring Italy closer  to the  other  two  countries  examined. -94-
V.  CONCLUSIQ\JS 
During  our  research  we  have  developed  for  each  of the  coun-
tries considered,  an  interpretation of the  evolution  of their respe£ 
tive  financial  systems.  Given  that the characteristics of the  three 
countries differ these  interpretations also differ.  In  view  of the 
impossibility of defining  an  "ideal"  model  of  financial  system  what 
we  have  primarily tried to do  is to identify the  specific  features 
of each  system  and  to evaluate their internal  coherency.  It remains 
true  however  that our  interpretation is  based  on  a  common  "proble-
matique"  (dating  from  the  1960s),  namely  the  need  to reconcile  a 
high  level of external  financing  of capital  accumulation  with  struc 
ture  ,f financial  systems  centred  on  the  banks. 
Regardless  of the  hopes  often  expressed  in  conferences  and 
studies  on  this question  in  none  of these  countries  has  the  "European 
financial  markets  problem"  been  resolved  through  a  strengthening of 
the  stock markets.  In all three the  porportion  of non-financial 
sectors' liabilities absorbed  by  the  banking  system  has  increased. 
As  a  result their financial  structures  have  failed  to  move  towards 
the Anglo-American  model,  taken  as  a  touch-stone  by  the  studies  of 
the  1960s.  Rather the  contrary it appears  that  the Anglo-American 
systems  (in  particular the  British system)  have  moved  towards  the 
"continental"  model. 
In all  probability the  failure  of continental Europe  to de-
velop  financial  systems  similar to  those  in Britain or North  America 
is due  to deep historic  reasons.  However  much  importance  one  may 
attach to specific  factors  such  as  the tax  regime  for  financial  as-
sets,  social security systems,  or the  existence of efficient organs 
of control  these are  not  enough  to  provide  a  full  explanation.  In 
t~e last analysis all these  factors  depend  on  decisions  taken  by  go 
vernments,  decisions  which  cannot  be  regarded  as  completely  indepen~ 
ent  of the  interests of  financial  institutions and  of  firms. -95-
The  history of economic  development  shows  that  the Anglo-
American  capital markets,  which  economists  tend  to  assume  as  their 
model  for an  ideal  financial  system are  in  fact  an  exception  to 
the  general  rule.  At  the  same  time  there  can  be  little doubt  that  in 
continental  Europe  the  paths  taken  to  high  economic  growth  were  dif-
ferent  from  those  which  characterized  the  precocious development  of 
Britain and  the United  States  and  the  corresponding structure of  fi 
nancial  markets.  The  characteristics of the  Anglo-American  markets 
can  be  explained  not  so  much  as  a  result of these  countries'  level 
of development  when  they were  first organised,  but  rather as  a  con-
sequence  of the  period  in  which  they  emerged.  This  also explains 
their relatively limited  capacity for  channelling  funds  from  the 
public to  firms.  The  development  of the  major  European  economies  has 
been  based  on  financial  systems  biased  towards  intermediaries  rather 
than  the  market.  With  respect  to these  intermediaries capital markets 
have  played  a  complementary  rather than  a  competitive  role.  The  rea-
sons  for  the  failure  to  put  Lamfalussy's  suggestions  into  practice 
are to be  found  in  the  lack  of interest,  on  the  part of the  banks, 
in  developing  a  broader capital market.  Nonetheless it is very doubt-
ful  whether it is in the  banks'  interest to replace  their direct  re-
lationship with  firms  with  holdings  in  investment  funds  (as  Lamfalu~ 
sy  suggested)  (Cesarini  (b)).  Both  in  Germany  and  France  major  firms 
have  a  relatively close  relationship with  the  financial  system.  Our 
research  shows  no  evidence that  finance  capital  has  dominated  the in-
dustrial  system.  It thus  seems  unlikely that there  have  been  any si-
gnificant limitations  on  firms•  willingness  to  look  for  risk capital. 
In  Italy where  this interpenetration  between  the  banks  and  major  in-
dustry hardly exists,  firms  have  received  far  from  negligible  bene-
fits  from  the  subsidized  credit  system. 
Our  analysis  of  the  evolution  of the  three  systems  from  half 
I 
way  through  the  1960s  until the  end  of the  1970s  has  shown  the diffe--96-
rent ways  in  which  it has  been  possible  to satisfy the  need  for  ex-
ternal  finance  for  the  accumulation  process.  In  France,  the  only 
country in  which  there  has  been  a  genuine  reform of the  credit  system 
the  financial  system  has  moved  closer to the German  banking  model. 
The  latter has  continued  to  be  centred  around  the  universal  bank  whose 
role  has  been  further  expanded  as  a  result of  bank  despecialization. 
Italy's financial  structure,  from  the  1960s  until recently,  has  re-
conciled  the  central  role of the  banking  system with  a  form  of cre-
dit specialization in  which  medium-long  term  credit is reserved  for 
non-banking  institutions.  As  a  consequence  she  has  taken  a  different 
path  from  that  followed  by  the  other two  countries. 
While  French  industrial growth  has  been  accompanied  by  a 
"decentralization" of investment  financing  from  the Treasury to the 
banks,  Italian development  has  been  based  on  the  "financial road  to 
growth".  Decisions  concerning  investment  financing  have  been  centra-
lized.  As  a  result,  at least until recently,  the  increased  role of 
the  banks  in  financial  intermediation  has  failed  to bring with it an 
increase in their responsibilities vis a vis  industrial credit. 
This  low  level of responsibility (with  respect to  the  banks' 
importance),  affects the  banks'  attitudes  both  towards  the  owners  of 
financial  wealth  and  towards  inflation.  The  Italian banks  have  not 
the German  and  French  banks'  same  interest in  consolidating their  li~ 
bilities. As  a  result  there  has  been  no  attempt  to hinder the  owners 
of financial  wealth  from  opting  for liquid assets;  rather the  con-
trary the  policy of granting a  high  return  on  current account  depo-
sits has  encouraged  this  tendency.  This  distinguishes  the Italian case 
from  the  situation  in Germany  or France,  where  even  in the  presence 
of a  relatively high  rate of inflation the  banks  have  succeeded  in 
shifting a  proportion  of their deposits  towards  longer maturities. 
The  Italian banks'  attitude of relative indifference towards  the  rna--97-
turities of their liabilities and  their limited  involvement  in  me-
dium-long  term  credit  help to  explain  why  the Italian banking  sys-
tem  has  failed  to  emulate  the  German  system  in  deterring inflation. 
The  negative effects of inflation  have  been  felt  not  by  the  banks 
but  by  the  special credit  institutions whose  role in  the  forming  of 
a  consensus  around  government  economic  policy is  far less  important. 
As  far as  capital accumulation  is concerned  the Italian fi-
nancial  system is in  a  contradictory position.  On  the  one  hand  it 
has  attempted  to  force  the  process  along;  on  the  other it has  proved 
inadequate to meet  its requirements. 
The  Italian credit  system's  structural .insuff:ilclef1CY to meet  the 
need  for  non-subsidized  financing  mainly affects  small  and  medium-
sized  firms. 
The  financing  of these  firms  has  also given  rise to  concern 
and  state intervention in the  other two  countries  considered  (as  well 
as  elsewhere).  The  difference  between  the  Italian situation  and  that 
in Germany  or France is that  in  these latter countries  special credit 
institutions and  intervention  by  government  have  been  grafted  onto 
a  system  in which  medium-long  term  credit was  already a  normal  part 
of the  banks'  activities.  If one  is to evaluate  the  role  of the  cre-
dit system  1n  selecting  between  different entrepreneurs  one  also  has 
to  bear in  mind  that the German  discrimination  in  favour  of large 
firms  was  the result of an  economic  policy implying  revaluation  of 
the  OM,  a  policy which  put  their entrepreneurial capabilities to a 
severe trial.  In  France  this  same  discrimination  fitted  in  with  an 
industrial policy in which  large  companies  had  been~couraged to  com 
mit  themselves  to large  highly innovatory  projects.  In  both  cases 
the  problems  which  arose  in  the  financing  of minor  enterprise  deriv 
ed  not  so much  from  the  behaviour of the  credit  system  as  from  the 
underlying rationale of development  policy.  This  rationale,  while -98-
working  to the  advantage  of  the  major industrial groups,  also asked 
for  something  in return.  In  Italy on  the  other  hand,  where  there 
was  no  such  policy of stimulating major  companies,it  was  primarily 
the  credit  system  which  had  to  select  firms  worthy of receiving fi-
nance  and  where  necessary encourage  innovation.  At  the  same  time  how 
ever the  very structure of the system  made  this  an  almost  impossible 
task. 
In  recent  years  there  have  been  structural changes  in  the 
Italian  financial  system  which  have  brought  the Italian  banks  closer 
to the  model  of the  other two  countries.  This  appears desirable  not 
because  the  French  and  German  models  represent  some  kind  of ideal 
but  rather as  a  coherent alternative to  the Anglo-American  model 
which  has difficulty in  taking roots  in  continental  Europe  and  which 
today is even  less of a  model  than  in  the  past. 
Last  but  not  least one  further result  of our investigation 
concerns  the  relationship between  the central  bank  and  the  financial 
system.  The  analysis  of the characteristics and  development  of the 
three  financial  systems  examined  has  provided  evidence  against  the 
idea  of the  central  bank's  policy as  an  exogenous  variable.  This  pr~ 
blem  has  recently been  studied  from  the  point  of view  of the relat-
ionship between  the  central  bank  and  government(Wooley).  What  emerges 
from  our  research  is the  importance of a  further  problem,  namely  that 
of whether the  central  bank's  behaviour is exogenous  with  respect  to 
the  structure of national  financial  system.  A likely hypothesis  to 
explain  the DBB's  monetarism  is that this is a  consequence  of the 
role of  the  universal  bank  in  the  German  financial  system  and  of the 
way  in  which  this influences  the  behaviour of the central  bank.  We  have 
also considered  the constraints  on  monetary  policy imposed  by  the 
structure of the  French  banking  system in  the  case of the  policy adopt 
ed  by  Barre.  Finally,  as  far as  Italy is concerned,  we  have  emphasized -~-
the  importance wbich  the  bonking  low  grants  the  central  bonk  1n  de-
termining  the optimal structure  for  the  financial  system  and  the 
way  in which  in this  case  too the central  bonk  has  been  influenced 
by  the  bonking  system.  This evidence  from  the three countries 
examined  thus  tends  to confirm  the  importance  of  the  problem  raised 
which  could  provide  on  interesting topic  for  future  research. - 100-
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